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ABSTRACT 
What drives economically buoyant Southeast Asian nations, enjoying post–Cold 
War peace, to procure arms in a manner that has observers concerned about a regional 
arms race? Are these acquisitions driven by threats from within the region or from 
potential hegemons like China? Alternatively, are the purchases actually driven by 
domestic factors? This thesis investigates the following four factors to determine which 
are most powerful in driving arms procurements in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore: 
availability of resources, domestic politics, external threats, and force modernization.  
By comparing these three countries, selected for their track record of being the 
largest defense spenders in Southeast Asia, this research finds that domestic factors (the 
availability of resources and domestic politics) were the strongest drivers. Consequently, 
the paucity of externally triggered instances of arms procurements undermines existing 
assertions of a regional arms race. As such, using Buzan and Herring’s arms 
dynamics model, the situation among the three countries is best characterized as 
being “arms maintenance,” with occasional excursions to “arms competitions” for 
prestige reasons. Looking toward the future, the worrying trajectories of domestic 
politics in these countries could supply the conditions that could incite more 
frequent excursions toward competitive arms dynamics.  
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Headlines about increased Asian military spending tend to highlight the spending 
sprees of China and India, but observers have also acknowledged this phenomenon in 
Southeast Asia. In 2012, The Economist noted that Southeast Asian governments had 
increased military spending by 13.5 percent compared to the previous year.1 This 
increased expenditure reflected a long-term trend that the International Institute of 
Strategic Studies (IISS) reported about in 2015, with Southeast Asian countries “[leading] 
Asian defense-spending growth since 2010, averaging 5.1 percent over the period.”2 
Such increased expenditures stand in stark contrast against the relative peace, rising 
prosperity, and increased security cooperation amongst Southeast Asian countries during 
the past 40 years. Indeed, apart from the East Timor Crisis and Vietnam’s invasion of 
Cambodia, the Vietnam War that ended in 1975 was the last major conflict in the region. 
The period since has thus been marked more by security cooperation than conflict.3 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION AND MAIN FINDINGS 
The juxtaposition of increased military spending and peaceful conditions has 
caused some observers to ask whether the region is engaged in an arms race. 
Alternatively, are the countries responding to the rise of a potential regional hegemon in 
China, or are the individual states simply embarking on arms build-ups independently? 
To characterize this phenomenon, the research question for this thesis is, “What are the 
underlying reasons driving arms procurement in Southeast Asian countries?” This thesis 
examines the arms acquisition efforts of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore to discern 
what factors best explain these procurement efforts, before adopting a regional lens to 
consider the security implications of these acquisitions. 
                                                 
1 “Shopping Spree: Military Spending in Southeast Asia,” The Economist, March 24, 2012, 40, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21551056.  
2 “Chapter Six: Asia,” The Military Balance 115, no. 1 (February 10, 2015), 210. 
3 The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) were 
formed in 1994 and 2006 respectively to anchor security cooperation in Southeast Asia. 
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This research finds that domestic factors—specifically the availability of 
resources and domestic politics—were the strongest drivers for arms procurement in the 
countries studied. Consequently, the paucity of externally-triggered instances of arms 
procurements undermines existing assertions of a regional arms race, leaving the arms 
dynamics best characterized as “maintenance” of the status quo, with occasional 
excursions to “arms competitions” for prestige reasons.4 Going forward, while there is 
cause for optimism for regional security, the worrying trajectories of domestic politics 
supply the conditions that could incite more frequent excursions towards competitive 
arms dynamics. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question is significant for two main reasons. First, it enhances 
understanding of the prospects for security in Southeast Asia. Second, it contributes to 
the academic conceptualization of Southeast Asian militarization, as the recent wave of 
arms purchases has not been studied in as much detail as earlier trends in procurement. 
The first point of significance centers on the implications of Southeast Asian 
countries’ arms purchases for regional security. On the one hand, the procurement of 
arms for military modernization is consistent with the paths of developed countries, and 
the presence of professional militaries amongst countries might build confidence and be 
stabilizing when the forces are oriented for regional security. On the other hand, countries 
might also be threatened by the procurement of arms by other states and could be reacting 
with arms build-ups of their own, exemplifying Jervis’ “Security Dilemma.”5 Such 
iterations of responsive arming could lead to an arms race, depending on the intensity of 
the procurement activity. Regional security could thus be threatened with the presence of 
greater military power that could be brought to bear if any disputes that erupt. 
This thesis also seeks to update the study of Southeast Asian arms build-ups that 
have been observed since the 1990s. As the literature review shows, most scholars of 
                                                 
4 The concepts of “maintenance” and “arms competition” are derived from the arms dynamic model, 
which will be introduced in Section C of this Introduction. Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, The Arms 
Dynamic in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 80–81. 
5 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 211. 
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Southeast Asian arms build-ups have focused on the 1990s—the first time such a 
dynamic was observed—with fewer investigating the wave of arms build-ups which 
began in the early 2000s. The difference in the level of attention is perplexing, 
considering the greater lethal capabilities that have been introduced in recent years. As 
such, this research is intended to provide an updated perspective on the reasons for the 
latest round of arms build-ups in Southeast Asia. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review is organized into three sections: a description of Southeast 
Asian arms acquisitions trends, possible explanations for these acquisitions, and the 
implications of these trends. First, it describes the two eras of Southeast Asian arms 
acquisitions before and after the 1997 East Asian Financial Crisis (EAFC). Second, it 
surveys possible reasons for these arms build-ups, with four main reasons analyzed in this 
thesis. Third, the review introduces the ‘arms dynamic’ framework as a means to study 
the arms procurement patterns described. 
1. Southeast Asian Arms Acquisition Trends 
Arms acquisition trends in Southeast Asia can be split into two eras divided by the 
1997 EAFC. This economic shock led to political upheaval, resulting in the change of 
regime leadership in Indonesia. Concurrently, the arms acquisition plans of regional 
militaries were also mostly derailed.  
a. Pre-EAFC Trends 
Mak identified that the first era of Southeast Asian arms acquisition spanned from 
the late 1980s into the 1990s,6 when Southeast Asian nations engaged in arms 
procurement at an increased rate even though there appeared to be a peace dividend that 
could be reaped from the demise of the Cold War.7 Two broad trends can be observed 
                                                 
6 Joon-Num Mak, ASEAN Defence Reorientation 1975–1992: The Dynamics of Modernization and 
Structural Change (Canberra, Australia: Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, Australian National 
University, 1993), 3.  
7 Bilveer Singh, The Challenge of Conventional Arms Proliferation in Southeast Asia (Jakarta: Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 26. 
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relating to (1) increasing military expenditure and (2) a shift towards building a 
conventional military. 
First, Southeast Asian states embarked on a consistent trend of increasing defense 
spending that was not aligned with global trends. From 1988 to 1997, the military 
expenditure of the six countries that formed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) grew 71.3 percent, in contrast to the global average that dropped by 31.7 
percent. Bilveer Singh noted the arms procurement activities of ASEAN, identifying this 
grouping as being most responsible for the “upsurge of arms acquisitions.”8 The strongest 
growth resulted from the efforts of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. These countries, 
on average, more than doubled their defense spending to fund the procurement of a range 
of military hardware for their armed forces.9 
Second, analysts noted that the weapons procured reflected a shift away from 
counter-insurgency operations and a desire to build conventional militaries. This 
transition was observed by Acharya, who noted that across Southeast Asia, there was a 
“clear emphasis on air and naval systems, rather than ground force equipment,” 
indicating a shift in the doctrinal focus of the militaries.10 This involved a long-term 
move to procure a broader mix of weapons systems like “tanks, combat aircraft, major 
naval platforms, and fast attack craft,” which was different from the ground-based 
weapons needed for fighting insurgents.11 This transition was clearly illustrated by 
purchases of airborne early warning aircraft and submarines by some countries.12 Such 
observations aligned with the analysis of Andrew Tan, who pointed out that the Southeast 
Asian nations had started to shift their focus toward improving the technology levels of 
their military.13  
                                                 
8 Singh, The Challenge of Conventional Arms Proliferation in Southeast Asia, 26. 
9 “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed 
May 13, 2015, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database.  
10 Amitav Acharya, An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 18. 
11 Ibid., 21. 
12 Ibid., 21 & 24. 
13 Andrew Tan, “Defense Spending and Procurement Trends in Southeast Asia,” in The Global Arms 
Trade: A Handbook, ed. Andrew Tan (New York: Routledge, 2014), 20. 
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b. Post-EAFC Trends 
In the aftermath of the EAFC, most countries in Southeast Asia were forced to 
scale back their arms procurements, but this break turned out to be only a brief 
intermission, as by 2001, “the region as a whole [had] resumed procuring modern 
weapons systems.”14 This second period of arms acquisition can be characterized by its 
(1) differentiated increase in military expenditure and by the (2) collective qualitative 
improvement of military capabilities. 
Quantitatively, Southeast Asian states resumed increased military spending after 
the EAFC, albeit at different rates. Indeed, averaging among the same six ASEAN 
nations, military expenditures rose 82.3 percent from 2000–2014, showing that they had 
resumed a pace of growth that was comparable to that prior to the EAFC. This time, 
however, the regional increase in military expenditure was accompanied by a global 
increase of 53.4 percent, suggesting that Southeast Asian expenditures were only slightly 
above the global average. When considering the military expenditure trend for individual 
countries, it is pertinent to observe that Indonesia and Malaysia increased their 
expenditures by impressive amounts of 211.1 and 101.7 percent, respectively, while 
Singapore’s expenditure only grew 24.7 percent. While these numbers appear to differ by 
a large amount, the growth in expenditures for Malaysia and Indonesia is inflated because 
their expenditures had dropped significantly after the EAFC. In contrast, the pace of 
military spending was maintained in Singapore, resulting in a smaller proportion of 
growth.15  
While the quantitative study of military spending patterns showed no significant 
difference prior to and after the EAFC, there was a collective improvement in the quality 
of Southeast Asian militaries, “evident from the introduction of new military capabilities 
which hitherto did not exist or were clearly under-emphasized.”16 Some of these 
capabilities included submarines, multi-role combat aircraft, multiple rocket launchers, 
                                                 
14 Tan, “Defense Spending and Procurement Trends in Southeast Asia,” 15. 
15 “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed 
May 13, 2015, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database.  
16 Tan, “Defense Spending and Procurement Trends in Southeast Asia,” 20. 
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precision guided munitions, and beyond visual range air intercept missiles; all of which 
increased the lethality and force projection capabilities of the militaries. This aggressive 
growth in military capabilities resulted in some writers warning of a potential arms race 
in the region,17 but Tan cautioned against any hasty and exaggerated assessments as the 
quantities procured tended to be small, reflecting arms procurement strategies that are 
“modest and are not aimed at building up large offensive military capabilities.”18  
Hence, this thesis aims to clarify the arms procurement situation in Southeast Asia 
by analyzing the drivers for arms procurement with a focus on acquisition patterns after 
the EAFC. The next section considers four main reasons for arms procurements, 
highlighted by Southeast Asian security and international relations experts, as key factors 
to be investigated. 
2. Survey of Reasons Driving Southeast Asian Arms Procurement 
Many reasons were identified as being possible causal factors for driving 
Southeast Asian arms procurement in the 1990s and after the EAFC. This section 
highlights four factors that were consistently emphasized by scholars. These factors are 
(a) Resource Availability, (b) Domestic Politics, (c) External Threats, and (d) Force 
Modernization. 
a. Resource Availability 
The process of arms procurement requires substantial financial resources, not just 
for the acquisition phase, but for the operations and maintenance phases as well. Hence, 
countries would need to assess their fiscal strength before committing to such 
acquisitions. It follows that countries that are in strong economic positions would be 
more inclined to build-up their militaries as they have the resources to fund arms 
procurements without sacrificing other priorities. Indeed, resource availability is a strong 
factor that was highlighted by many analysts across both eras of arms acquisitions. As 
                                                 
17 Desmond Ball, “Arms Modernization in Asia: An Emerging Complex Arms Race,” in The Global 
Arms Trade: A Handbook, ed. Andrew Tan (New York: Routledge, 2014), 30. 
18 Tan, “Defense Spending and Procurement Trends in Southeast Asia,” 27. 
 7 
Mak explained, “the economic affordability of any defense program is…a prime 
consideration” in deciding what acquisitions to undertake.19 
During the economic boom prior to the 1997 EAFC, a host of scholars found that 
increased state wealth was an enabling factor for increased military expenditure across 
Southeast Asia. Rolls identified the “availability of resources” as “highly significant in 
facilitating or enabling the acquisition of major weapons systems by many of the 
states,”20 with Ball stating that “rates of economic growth provide the single best 
indicator of increases in defense expenditures.”21 On the same note, Bilveer Singh noted 
that “a major factor explaining the willingness and greater propensity of the ASEAN 
countries to go on an arms purchasing spree [was] due to the availability of funds for 
defense expenditure.”22 This causal link identified by the scholars was further 
strengthened by the cancellation of arms deals when the EAFC struck.23 Finally, looking 
within ASEAN, Acharya also pointed out that the “highest increase in defense spending 
has occurred in Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia—countries that experienced the best 
economic growth,”24 indicating that the arms procurement rates depended partly on the 
strength of the economy. These authors all agreed that arms procurement was driven, at 
least in part, by the availability of resources. 
The logic that the availability of resources drove arms procurement persisted in 
the 2000s, when military expenditures resumed their upward trend, with analysts 
highlighting the connection between these rising expenditures and the economic 
recoveries post-EAFC. Kang observed that “rising defense budgets” were “a reflection of 
increasing prosperity,”25 and Bitzinger also noted that strong economic growth funded 
                                                 
19 Mak, ASEAN Defence Reorientation 1975–1992, 12. 
20 Mark G. Rolls, The ‘Arms Dynamic’ in Southeast Asia during the Second Cold War (Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate, 2002), 139. 
21 Desmond Ball, “Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 
International Security 18, no. 3 (1994), 81, doi: 10.2307/2539206. 
22 Singh, The Challenge of Conventional Arms Proliferation in Southeast Asia, 60. 
23 Rolls, The ‘Arms Dynamic’ in Southeast Asia, 139. 
24 Acharya, An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia?, 39. 
25 David Kang, “A Looming Arms Race in East Asia? The Answer Might Surprise You,” The 
National Interest, May 14, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/looming-arms-race-east-asia-10461. 
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defense budgets, whilst allowing the governments to maintain a consistent defense 
burden—the defense share of GDP—at a sustainable rate.26 Wang also focused on the 
importance of the availability of resources, adopting a statistical approach to support the 
claim that GDP had a “significant positive effect” on arms expenditure.27 Hence, across 
both time spans, experts identified the availability of state resources as a driver for arms 
procurement in Southeast Asia.  
b. Domestic Politics  
Building upon the notion that the amount of resources available could determine 
the level of arms procurement, scholars who examined domestic politics in Southeast 
Asia also observed that the process of by which governments divided their budgets was 
an equally relevant factor. For instance, Bilveer Singh observed in 1995 that military 
expenditure was becoming a smaller fraction of GDPs across Southeast Asia, reflecting 
the classic trade-off between ‘guns versus butter.’28 In these countries, social demands 
could draw greater political attention and resources than security demands. Nevertheless, 
domestic politics is a multifaceted issue as its inner workings and norms vary 
substantially across borders. As such, in surveying the findings of various writers, three 
main themes emerged: (1) competition amongst political stake-holders that affects 
defense budget allocation, (2) endemic corruption that distorts the procurement process, 
and (3) the desire for national prestige that garners greater support for defense 
expenditures.  
First, competition amongst political stake-holders affects defense budget 
allocations. In part, this is related to the degree of influence that the military has in 
domestic politics. Indeed, a military with strong political influence could drive the 
decision-making process of governments in a way that increases defense budgets, funding 
more arms procurements. Acharya pointed out that, prior to the EAFC, while 
                                                 
26 Richard Bitzinger, “Southeast Asian Naval Expansion and Its Risks,” The Straits Times, May 14, 
2015, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/south-east-asia-naval-expansion-and-its-risks.  
27 Yu Wang, “Determinants of Southeast Asian Military Spending in the Post-Cold War Era: A 
Dynamic Panel Analysis,” Defence and Peace Economics 24, no. 1 (2012): 82, 
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rationalizations about “strategic need and economic affordability” had a bearing on arms 
procurement decisions, for ASEAN, “the influence of the military over the government 
apparatus… [has] some influence on the decision making process.”29 He cited how the 
Thai military was able to “fend off budget cutbacks initiated by parliament by applying 
pressure on politicians.”30 Similarly, Bilveer Singh also noted how inter-service rivalry 
and “ambition also played a major role in arms purchases,” as “decisions regarding 
weapons acquisitions frequently reflect a service chief’s desire to be remembered for 
having introduced a sophisticated weapon system.”31 After the EAFC, Hartfiel and Job 
also contended that, some Southeast Asian militaries still “[carried] substantial political 
clout,” reflecting their ability to exert political pressure to support and encourage larger-
than-expected arms acquisitions.32  
Conversely, if the domestic political environment was composed of stronger 
voices for social programs, more resources would be allocated for efforts such as 
education, transportation, and healthcare. In this line of reasoning, there were also voices 
downplaying the significance of military influence, as Rolls argued that the military’s 
part in the decision-making process was only of “marginal importance.”33 Highlighting 
the importance of social programs, he surmised that the final decisions were always 
“tempered by a realization that the demands of national development took first priority 
and that any arms acquisitions should be affordable and appropriate to the prevailing 
strategic situation.”34 This was similarly observed by Mak, who noted that the Indonesian 
military appreciated the preeminence of national priorities.35  
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Second, the presence of corruption in domestic politics introduces distortions into 
the decision-making process of some Southeast Asian countries, creating alternative 
incentives to embark on arms procurements. Indeed, the nature of huge arms procurement 
contracts creates avenues for subterfuge and corruption because the inclusion of 
components, such as logistics support and training, lead to complex contracts that can be 
manipulated for corrupt ends. Hence, the causal process here is that an increased level of 
corruption in the decision making process can encourage arms procurement for the 
anticipated kickbacks. The relevance of corruption to arms procurement in Southeast 
Asia is most bluntly stated by Bilveer Singh, who identified corruption as “play[ing] a 
role in the decision to buy arms.”36 Meanwhile, Acharya also highlighted corruption as 
an influencing factor in the “decision-making process.”37 Indeed, for countries like 
Indonesia, the presence of corruption was publicly acknowledged by ex-Defense Minister 
Sudarsono, who claimed that “up to 40% of procurement proposals could be mark-
ups.”38 As such, this thesis investigates how corruption in domestic politics drives the 
decision-making process for the procurement of weapons. 
Third, the desire for prestige appears to be a relevant motive in domestic politics 
that affects arms procurement trends in Southeast Asia. Nationalism has traditionally 
been a powerful force for many Southeast Asian countries, and the image of militaries 
has been a tangible manifestation of the strength and prestige of a nation. As Tim Huxley 
observed, “within Southeast Asia, there has been a perennial and widespread concern to 
‘keep up with the neighbors’ for both prestige and military reasons.”39 This is 
particularly the case when procurements are made with little operational need, or when 
the stated justifications made by politicians are based on reasons of prestige. For 
example, the procurement of Main Battle Tanks (MBT) by Indonesia was considered ill-
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advised given the archipelagic context of Indonesia, as well as the tropical terrain of soft 
muddy grounds and dense forests. Similarly, Malaysia’s then-Defense Minister Najib 
justified the need for MiG-29 jets on the basis that “Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand 
[had] the F-16 while [Malaysia had] no such fighter aircraft.”40 Whilst there might have 
been reasonable professional reasons for the purchase of such sophisticated weaponry, 
those reasons were not portrayed up front, and instead, an emotional appeal to national 
pride and prestige was used, probably because such an approach was deemed to win 
greater support. 
Before the EAFC, besides Acharya’s identification of prestige as a relevant 
impetus, Ball also attributed the “acquisition of sophisticated weapons systems” to “the 
attendant prestige” of owning such equipment.41 Specifically, he suggested that the 
ability to “operate and maintain” such “high-technology weapon systems…was an 
indicator of political and economic modernization.”42 Meanwhile, Mak noted that there 
was a “competition for status between the ASEAN members,” and countries have sought 
sophisticated systems for prestige.43 Since the EAFC, the factor of prestige remains 
relevant, as “submarines tend to be sought after in part for symbolic reasons.”44  
c. External Threat 
Commenting that “to enhance one’s security is the primary and primordial 
motivation for armament,” Bilveer Singh is one of many writers who identified external 
security threats as one of the causal factors for the arms procurement trends in Southeast 
Asia.45 These writers framed the external threats in two categories of intra-regional and 
extra-regional threats.46  
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First, intra-regional tensions were commonplace amongst Southeast Asian 
nations, leading some militaries to make plans to deal with any contingencies. Bilveer 
Singh saw that the end of the Cold War had a “decompression” effect that allowed “the 
surfacing of intra-ASEAN territorial disputes,” such as Pedra Branca (between Malaysia 
and Singapore) and Ligitan and Sipadan (between Malaysia and Indonesia).47 
Additionally, because these disputes “involved the question of sovereignty,” they tended 
to “linger on for a long time,” festering as long-term “irritants to bilateral 
relationships.”48 With such long-standing tensions, Acharya also asserted that such 
scenarios formed the “basis of contingency planning,” whereby operational and 
procurement plans were laid out to address any eventualities.49 This notion of bolstering 
militaries to prepare for contingencies was also echoed by Wattanayagorn and Ball.50 
To a certain extent, such procurement plans appeared to reveal the underlying 
intra-regional tensions that were sometimes not acknowledged in public. Indeed, although 
the states traditionally “do not…explicitly identify each other as security threats,” 
analysts have pointed out that “many of the weapon systems accumulated…are externally 
oriented…designed for conventional interstate warfare.”51 Huxley concurs, suggesting 
that, “it is clear that certain pairs of Southeast Asian states have made and still make 
serious plans for war with each other.”52 Hence, there is some credence that intra-
regional tensions and threat perceptions have a causal relationship with arms purchases. 
Second, Southeast Asian countries are also vulnerable to potential threats from the 
regions surrounding Southeast Asia, particularly China. Before the EAFC, scholars 
agreed that the South China Sea (SCS) dispute presented the “most serious and urgent 
security problem.”53 The situation improved in the early 2000s when China embarked on 
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a charm offensive underscored by the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) 
of Parties in the South China Sea with ASEAN. Unfortunately, more assertive Chinese 
actions resumed from 2007 onwards causing an increase in Sino-Vietnamese tensions, 
escalating the SCS conflict again. 
This oscillating pattern of Chinese words and actions has resulted in wariness and 
cynicism amongst Southeast Asian states regarding China’s intentions. Indeed, Wang 
argued that “Southeast Asian nations do not unanimously perceive the rise of China as a 
security threat,” but “rather, the level of perceived threat is conditioned upon the 
existence of unresolved territorial disputes with China.”54 To this end, Bitzinger 
identified Vietnam as a country that appeared to be arming up against China, validating 
the wider impression that Beijing’s actions were driving arms acquisitions in some 
Southeast Asian countries.55 This trend also corroborates Wang’s statistical approach that 
showed a correlation between the rise of China and military expenditure in Southeast 
Asia.56 Finally, Collin Koh studied the development of amphibious forces in the region, 
highlighting how tensions with China over the SCS dispute influenced arms procurement, 
providing more empirical evidence of this trend.57 
Still, scholars have not agreed on whether intra-regional or extra-regional threats 
act as stronger driving force for arms procurement. For instance, Bilveer Singh suggested 
that the greater threat lies within ASEAN itself,58 whilst Acharya contended that the 
influence of bilateral disputes was sometimes “overstated.”59 Meanwhile, Rolls 
considered the threats together and asserted that external threats were still more important 
than domestic factors.60 As such, it can only be surmised that external security threats 
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have, in some part, caused arms procurement in Southeast Asia before and after the 
EAFC. This thesis will delve into this factor in more detail. 
d. Force Modernization 
The fourth driver of Southeast Asian arms procurement commonly cited by 
scholars relates to the requirement to modernize military forces, especially for the 
replacement of aging equipment. While force modernization could easily be used as a 
non-antagonistic justification for internal balancing against external threats, scholars 
found that there were situations when Southeast Asian states invested in arms 
procurements purely as a means of maintaining the technological relevance of their 
armed forces. At the same time, analysts also asserted that it was reasonable for militaries 
to embark on “normal, cyclical process[es] of replacing older…equipment” for reasons of 
safety, cost efficiency, and effectiveness.61  
Prior to the EAFC, Southeast Asian militaries were progressively transforming 
their forces based on a shift from maintaining internal security to enforcing territorial 
integrity using conventional forces.62 This situation was particularly relevant for 
Indonesia and Malaysia, which had both experienced prolonged internal security threats 
from communist forces and minority ethnic groups.63 To achieve this force 
transformation, Bilveer Singh noted that there was a need to “replace obsolete weapons” 
and “upgrade earlier weapons systems.”64 Finally, added responsibilities of maritime 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) surveillance that arose with the promulgation of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) also motivated initiatives 
to modernize military capabilities.65 
After the EAFC, the scope for force modernization expanded further, as the two 
new mission areas, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and anti-terror 
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efforts, took center-stage. First, the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was highlighted by many 
nations as justification to raise amphibious forces to cope with HADR missions.66 
Second, the 9/11 incident and the Global War on Terror were also cited as another reason 
for the bolstering of defense forces.67 However, in both cases, the authors also found that 
the nature of weapon systems procured were “beyond HADR needs,”68 or that they had 
“little or no internal security application.”69 Therefore, these reasons appeared to be 
convenient covers for pursuing arms procurement activities. 
 It is thus apparent that force modernization needs to be approached with scrutiny. 
While Southeast Asian states have regularly referred to modernization to justify arms 
procurement, the procurement patterns that emerged have sometimes resulted in systems 
that are not exactly suited for the purported demands. This is further complicated by the 
fact that the demands have shifted with time, making force modernization an important 
and yet, amorphous justification for arms procurement. 
3. Implications of the Southeast Asian Arms Procurement Trends 
Building upon how the four factors drive arms acquisitions in individual 
countries, how can one better characterize the arms procurement trends as a region? 
Indeed, the primary concern is if these arms procurement efforts would result in, or are 
already indicative of, a regional arms race. This section first reviews scholarly 
assessments, which generally suggest that an arms race is not present in the region. 
Second, an alternative model—the arms dynamic—is introduced as a tool to understand 
the arms procurement patterns of Southeast Asia. 
a. Was There an Arms Race in Southeast Asia?  
Before reviewing observations of whether there was an arms race in Southeast 
Asia, it is prudent to outline how a classical arms race is defined. Samuel Huntington first 
defined the arms race as “a progressive, competitive peacetime increase in armaments by 
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two states or coalition of states resulting from competing purposes or mutual fears,” 
emphasizing that the phenomenon must manifest with increased military strength with 
“reciprocal interaction between states.”70 Colin Gray built on this definition, emphasizing 
the element of rapidity. He wrote in 1971 that an arms race is characterized by “two or 
more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing 
or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and structuring their military postures with a 
general attention to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behavior of the 
other parties.”71 Noting that the characteristics of adversarial competition and accelerated 
arms procurement are fundamental features of an arms race, how have scholars assessed 
the arms procurement patterns before and after the EAFC? 
Contrary to news headlines, numerous scholars in the pre-EAFC era, including 
Acharya, Ball, Rolls, Mak, and Singh, concluded that the arms build-ups did not fit the 
criteria of an arms race. In fact, Rolls went so far as to mention that this assessment was 
actually “not contentious,” adding that there was wide support for the position.72 On the 
whole, the authors rejected the arms race label for two main reasons: the slow pace and 
small scale of the build-up and the diversity of reasons for the build-up.  
First, some analysts argued that the speed and scale of these arms procurements 
were not as fast as necessary to be considered part of an arms race. Bilveer Singh noted 
that “defense expenditures have not risen to the same degree as to indicate ‘abnormal 
rates of growth.’”73 While acknowledging increased levels of arms procurement, Singh 
attributed the increases to “growing economic prowess rather than an arms spiraling 
contest.”74 Finally, Ball similarly highlighted how the “proportions of GDP being 
allocated to defense…[were] generally decreasing,” further dispelling the notion of 
countries making strenuous and competitive efforts to procure arms.75 
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Second, some scholars highlighted that the underlying reasons for the arms 
procurement patterns were multifaceted and not solely challenging external threats. 
Indeed, Mak argued that Southeast Asia’s arms procurement actions were “due to a 
combination of external and internal factors (including non-threat dynamics).”76 Acharya 
took a similar view, elaborating that the security environment confronting Southeast 
Asian states was a composite of “uncertainty stemming from the changing role of major 
powers,” elevation of maritime issues, as well as “interactive factors related to power, 
prestige and bargaining power.”77 Therefore, the arms race hypothesis failed because 
arms procurement were not characterized by rapid and antagonistic competition, and they 
are more “uncertainty driven” than “threat driven.”78 
With such a verdict cast on the arms procurement patterns in the 1990s, scholars 
in the 2000s appeared less interested in the prospects of an arms race in Southeast Asia. 
Again, it was news media and magazines—Newsweek, the Wall Street Journal, and the 
Financial Times—that published articles proclaiming an ongoing arms race, citing the 
procurement of offensive systems like submarines by multiple nations.79 The few 
scholars who contested that rhetoric declined to call it an arms race. Bitzinger surmised 
that the countries did not display “a high degree of public animosity and antagonism,”80 
and their acquisition rate was not “‘rapid’ or ‘extensive.’”81 Loo agreed, noting the 
absence of any competitive racing in how the arms were procured.82   
Therefore, it can be seen that many writers from both time periods did not 
consider there to be an arms race in progress in Southeast Asia. Yet, Bitzinger notes that 
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to describe “Southeast Asian arms acquisitions as just [the] recapitalization of local 
militaries is equally dissatisfying,” as it is apparent that “the countries are engaged in 
something far beyond the mere modernization of their armed forces.”83 Hence, 
alternative theories to better frame the phenomenon need to be considered.  
b. The Arms Dynamic Model 
Part of the reason why the arms procurement patterns of Southeast Asia have not 
been labelled as arms races has been due to the specificity of the definition.84 This 
sentiment was espoused by Gray himself, who denounced his definition in 1996 with the 
opinion that the arms race was an “unhelpful metaphor” as it described a unique situation 
that was not practical for application.85 It was at this point that Buzan and Herring 
demurred, pointing out that despite the specificity of the definition and its resultant 
sparseness of examples, a full-scale arms race was a useful marker to define a spectrum 
of intensities in arms build-ups.86 They proposed that instead of “a dichotomy of arms 
racing or not arms racing,” it was more useful to think of a continuum ranging from a 
fully developed arms race to an arms build-down scenario.87 (See Figure 1.)  
Figure 1.  Depiction of Continuum of Arms Dynamic. 
 
Adapted from Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 79–81. 
On the far end of the continuum is an all-out arms race, as suggested by Gray and 
Huntington, whilst on the opposite end is an arms build-down, similar to Gorbachev’s 
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unilateral cuts. The middle of the continuum refers to efforts to maintain the status quo 
and military balance. This brings us to the “gray” region between “maintenance” and 
“arms racing” that is termed “arms competition,” which covers cases where potential 
adversaries “chip away at the status quo and constantly seek to improve their position, 
although having no confidence in gaining a decisive advantage.”88 With the introduction 
of the arms dynamic concept, analysts and foreign policy practitioners are more equipped 
to accurately categorize the range of possible trajectories of military development. 
Indeed, this framework has served as the foundation for other studies on the arms 
procurement patterns of Southeast Asia, and this concept is applied in this thesis to better 
frame the patterns observed in the region.89 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis focuses on assessing the degree to which four causal factors function 
as underlying drivers for the arms acquisition patterns. As such, the four hypotheses are 
outlined as follows.  
Hypothesis One: Resource availability is one of the main underlying drivers of the 
Southeast Asian arms build-up. This hypothesis asserts that the arms procurement 
patterns of Southeast Asia are fundamentally driven by the fact that the governments 
enjoyed strong economic growth and healthy government budgets. In other words, the 
acquisitions are driven by the supply of funds and not primarily because of having to 
balance against security threats. 
Hypothesis Two: Domestic politics is one of the main underlying drivers of the 
Southeast Asian arms build-up. This hypothesis proposes that it is the nature of domestic 
politics that drives arms procurements in Southeast Asia. It suggests that while economic 
growth might generate funds, it is more critical to understand how allocations are 
decided. Additionally, corrupt motivations such as self-aggrandizement and the desire for 
national prestige could also drive arms procurement through the domestic political arena. 
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Hypothesis Three: The need to defend against external threats is one of the main 
underlying drivers of the Southeast Asian arms build-up. This hypothesis proposes that 
the more traditional reason for building militaries serves as the main driver for Southeast 
Asian arms procurement efforts. If this hypothesis were true, particularly for the case of 
intra-ASEAN challenges, there is a greater possibility that a security dilemma could 
materialize as the countries attempt to address perceived security challenges by engaging 
in more procurement, inadvertently creating more insecurity for their neighbors. 
Hypothesis Four: Force modernization is one of the main underlying drivers of 
the Southeast Asian arms build-up. This hypothesis proposes that professional military 
needs drives arms procurement efforts. As such, arms are only procured to replace ageing 
equipment or to acquire new capabilities. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis uses comparative analysis to investigate the factors that explain the 
procurement patterns observed in Southeast Asia. These findings test the four hypotheses, 
allowing conclusions to be drawn about how the regional arms build-up can best be 
characterized. 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore have been selected as the three case studies 
for the following reasons. First, these countries have consistently been amongst the 
largest military spenders in Southeast Asia, accounting for more than 60% of total 
military expenditure since 2003.90 In fact, Singapore was the fifth largest importer of 
weapons worldwide in 2012.91 Second, while one might expect Vietnam and the 
Philippines—arguably most affected by dramatic changes in their security environment 
because of the SCS dispute—to spend the most on defense, Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
Singapore continue to outspend Vietnam and the Philippines. As such, their sustained 
track record of military expenditure allows for a longer term analysis. Third, the three 
countries are close neighbors with histories of regional tension, and some writers have 
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asserted that an internal arms dynamic exists amongst the three countries, which makes a 
comparative study of the three countries relevant.92  
A mix of quantitative and qualitative sources are used in this research. 
Quantitative economic performance data is used to describe the economic health of the 
country. Next, metrics, including the percentage of GDP and the percentage of budgets 
spent on defense, indicates the level of resources that these nations commit to defense. At 
the same time, military expenditures and arms procurement data from the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is gathered and analyzed. Meanwhile, 
qualitative sources comprising the announcements of arms procurements, think-tank 
summaries of military capability surveys, and secondary source scholarly articles shed 
light on the discourse regarding the foreign policies of the three nations. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis seeks to identify the underlying reasons for the arms procurement 
patterns in Southeast Asia, specifically investigating how the four factors drive 
acquisitions trends. The findings provide a foundation for an assessment on how the 
Southeast Asian arms build-up lies with respect to the arms dynamic model and its 
security implications. Chapters II to IV analyze the four factors for Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and Singapore in turn. Chapter V summarizes the reasons that drive the Southeast Asian 
arms build-up, addresses the four hypotheses, and assesses the regional security 
implications of the Southeast Asian arms build-up.  
In all, this research concludes that the evidence most strongly supports hypotheses 
one and two, suggesting that the availability of resources and domestic politics were the 
strongest drivers for arms procurement in the three countries. The influence of such 
domestic factors therefore accentuate concerns about the existing trajectories of internal 
politics, as the trends toward adversarial politics could allow nationalistic appeals to more 
competitive arms dynamics in Southeast Asia, which could negatively affect regional 
security.  
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II. MALAYSIA 
This chapter will examine the four hypotheses raised in the introduction to discern 
the relative strengths of the drivers for Malaysia in the years 2000–2015. To first set the 
context, a review of Malaysia’s arms procurement record since the EAFC is presented, 
highlighting key combatants and capabilities that have been inducted.  
A. REVIEW OF ARMS PROCUREMENT 
The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) notes that the Malaysian 
Armed Forces (MAF) has benefitted from “substantial modernization programs over the 
last 30 years” to develop the “capacity for external defense,” as they were initially 
focused on counter-insurgency operations.93 Figure 2 shows all the key arms 
procurements made in the last fifteen years of that modernization drive. The 
procurements are segmented by the three MAF services and arranged chronologically by 
when the orders were finalized. They have been displayed over three five-year blocks to 
provide a visualization of the pace of arms purchases by Malaysia since 2000.  
In the years 2000–2015, the key combatants that were added to the MAF include 
the Su-30MKM fighter jets, ASTROS-II Multiple Rocket System (MRS), PT-91 Main 
Battle Tanks (MBT), New Generation Patrol Vessels (NGPV), Scorpene submarines, 
Second Generation Patrol Vessels—Littoral Combat Ships (SGPV-LCS), and Missile 
Surface Corvettes (MSC). These platforms reflect the broad-based development of the 
MAF to induct modern platforms and capabilities in all three domains, bringing aspects 
of power projection with long-range systems like the Su-30MKM, and the ASTROS-II 
MRS. 
Further analysis of Figure 2 reveals two trends. First, the pace of procurements 
has tapered off since the surge of purchases during 2000–2005. Within the first time 
period, 22 orders were placed, as opposed to ten in 2006–2010 and six in 2011–2015. 
While the Royal Malaysian Air Force (Tentera Udara Diraja Malaysia, TUDM) and 
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Royal Malaysian Navy (Tentera Laut Diraja Malaysia, TLDM) ordered big tickets 
systems like the Su-30MKMS, the NGPVs, and the submarines in this initial surge, the 
emphasis of 2000–2005 was the Royal Malaysian Army (Tentera Darat Malaysia, TDM), 
with purchases of the 18 ASTROS-II MRS, 48 PT-91 MBTs, 11 Helicopters, more than 
200 Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV), and an assortment of Ground-Based Air Defense 
(GBAD) units. Most analysts agree that this initial surge of procurement represented the 
resumption of arms procurements that had been put on hold during the EAFC.94 
Figure 2.  Malaysia: Main Arms Procurements since 2000 
 
Adapted from “SIPRI Arms Trade Register,” Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, accessed May 16, 2015, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade 
/page/trade_register.php; Jane’s IHS Database, Jane’s IHS, accessed May 25, 2015, 
http://janes.ihs.com.  
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Second, if the surge within the first time period focused on land combatants, the 
priorities in 2006–2010 shifted to equipping the TUDM. The equipping was broad-based, 
with procurements of combatant platforms interspersed with surveillance radars, transport 
and training aircraft, and more advanced munitions for existing fighters. Finally, the most 
significant procurement decisions of 2011–2015, were the double purchase of six SGPV-
LCS and six South Korean-designed MSCs, signaling a renewed focus on the maritime 
domain.  
Against this backdrop of the nature of Malaysia’s arms procurement patterns from 
2000–2015, this chapter analyzes the four causal hypotheses in turn, to assess the degree 
to which they have driven arms acquisitions in these countries. 
B. RESOURCE AVAILABILITY 
By characterizing the defense economics of Malaysia, this section demonstrates 
the strong relevance of the resource availability factor for the MAF arms build-up. Three 
main observations are made to support this assessment. First, the trend of Malaysian GDP 
and military expenditure are closely correlated, as seen in Figure 3.95 It is widely 
recognized that the Malaysian government has had a track record of prioritizing 
economic development.96 At times, the economic policies were unconventional in nature, 
as under then-Prime Minister (PM) Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia went against the 
recommendations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and implemented capital 
controls whilst blaming the crisis on the “weaknesses of the international financial 
architecture.”97 In so doing, Malaysia recovered to produce strong average GDP growth 
of 11.7 percent up until 2012—only slowing down to single-digit growth in 2012–2014. 
During much of this time span, military expenditure grew in close correlation with GDP, 
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best illustrated by the near-identical fluctuations of GDP and military expenditure in 
response to the global financial crisis of 2008.  
Figure 3.  Malaysia: GDP and Military Expenditure Post-EAFC 
  
Adapted from “World Bank Database,” World Bank, accessed May 27, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org and “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, accessed May 13, 2015, http://www.sipri.org/
research/armaments/milex/milex_database.  
Second, however, while the GDP growth seemed to taper slightly after 2012, 
military expenditure appeared to level off more distinctly. Specifically, although 
Malaysia’s growth slowed slightly to an average of 4.4 percent from 2012–2014, defense 
expenditures only inched up by 0.8 percent. In other words, even though economic 
growth continued to generate resources to fund MAF development, military expenditure 
practically stagnated during this time span. On the one hand, this can be interpreted to 
mean that the influence resource availability had in driving military expenditure had 
reduced as defense spending did not correlate as closely as it had before. On the other 
hand, as the weaker economic growth of 2012–2014 was a sizeable slow-down relative to 
the strong growth in the years before the 2008 global financial crisis, there has thus been 
a sense that Malaysia was in an “era of relative austerity,” resulting in the reduced arms 
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procurement.98 The latter analysis is more relevant as the tight Malaysian budget has 
been further constrained by a “prolonged slump in oil prices,” leading “Malaysian 
acquisition plans” to be “postponed for reasons of financial constraints.”99  
Still, more analysis is required to understand why military expenditure declined to 
a greater degree than GDP, and a study of how defense is prioritized by the Malaysian 
government leads to the third observation that Malaysia has also maintained a moderate 
military expenditure policy where defense has steadily lost prominence in the budgetary 
process. This phenomenon can be observed in the defense shares of GDP and of the 
government budget, which are depicted in Figure 4. 
Figure 4.  Malaysia: Military Expenditure as a Share of GDP and National 
Budget 
  
Adapted from “World Bank Database,” World Bank, accessed May 27, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org and “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, accessed May 13, 2015, http://www.sipri.org/
research/armaments/milex/milex_database.  
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With reference to Figure 4, as a share of the GDP (red line), it can be seen that 
military expenditure has stayed generally level, which is logical given how closely 
defense spending correlated with GDP. The long term trend, however, shows a decade-
long decline from the peak of 2.6 percent in 2003 to its lowest level of 1.5 percent in 
2014. As a share of the national budget (orange line), after the initial fluctuations 
immediately following the EAFC, the trend has been dominated by a peak in 2003–2005 
and consistent decline since. During the 2003–2005 peak, defense commanded an 
average of 13.1 percent of the national budget, which corresponds with the surge of arms 
procurement from 2000–2005 that was depicted earlier in Figure 2. 
After the 2003–2005 peak, one can observe the fall in the prioritization for 
defense, with its share declining towards 7.1 percent in 2013. Compared to the global 
average of 9.3 percent, it is clear that Malaysia has been diverting resources away from 
defense, and it has been restrained in military expenditure. Indeed, Defense Minister 
(DM) Hishammuddin Tun Hussein’s June 2015 Parliamentary statement outlining 
defense procurement priorities for the next five years reflected a pragmatic approach in 
light of limited finances, indicating that “any procurements must be in line with the 
threats Malaysia faced.”100 He further explained that there was no sense in investing in 
“Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCAs) if the risks were from armed groups like the 
Islamic State.”101 Hence, while Malaysia possessed the resources that fueled the initial 
procurement surges, the weaker economic performance since 2008 has reduced resources 
available for defense. Additionally, the reduced prioritization of defense exacerbates the 
lack of resources, amplifying the impact of the resource availability factor.  
C. DOMESTIC POLITICS 
As outlined in the introduction, domestic politics will be discussed in three areas: 
budgetary competition amongst political stake-holders, the distorting effects of 
corruption, and the desire for national prestige. When considering competition amongst 
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domestic political stake-holders in Malaysia, the statistics outlined in Figure 4 depict how 
defense has suffered a general decline as a share of the government budget since its peak 
in 2003–2005, revealing how other national demands have increasingly been prioritized 
over defense.  
The weak political support for defense spending can be seen from how the 
government was careful not to make high defense expenditure a “negative election issue” 
in 2012.102 Even when defense spending was approved, priority was directed towards 
projects like the SGPV-LCS and the AV-8 IFVs, which “maximized local 
involvement.”103 Both of these projects involved local partners—Boustead Heavy 
Industries Corporation, a ship-building company, and DefTech, a Malaysian armed 
vehicle company—maximizing domestic employment and precluding the defense budget 
from becoming a political issue.104 From another perspective, the degree that defense has 
become such a politically sensitive issue in recent times is a manifestation of the 
weakening position of the ruling coalition, the Barisan Nasional (BN). As such, it is 
understandable why “political considerations appear to play a crucial role in the final 
selection of equipment.”105 
The trend of reducing defense allocation also reflects the weak political influence 
of the MAF, which was developed from a legacy of strong civil-military links that 
created a lack of “friction” in terms of budget allocations.106 This legacy also involved 
the Finance Ministry as the final arbiter of acquisition decisions, with the Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) only responsible for providing technical inputs, typically resulting in the 
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lowest cost bids winning.107 Since Najib Razak became PM, “major procurement 
decisions often appear to circumvent the MOD and are instead handled directly by the 
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO),” again underscoring how the military does not possess 
much influence in this process.108 Indeed, PM Najib’s concurrent appointment as the 
Finance Minister underscores his control over this process, which is further augmented 
by his ability to “source additional money from unconventional funding streams” like the 
use of interest-free Islamic banking systems (also known as sukuk).109 In all, other 
political interests trump defense requirements in Malaysia, and even within the defense 
procurement process, the MAF and MOD are displaced from the center of gravity, 
making it less likely that the military can influence higher levels of arms procurement. 
The second domestic politics factor relates to corruption, where the concentration 
of procurement decision-making power discussed above creates avenues for corruption 
that could incentivize officials to engage in more arms procurement for self-
aggrandizement. Corruption can fester as there is generally a “lack of public attention” 
towards foreign policy and security because there is a much greater interest in the 
domestic aspects of politics.110 Despite this, the government still exercises political 
caution by avoiding excessively high defense budgets prior to elections, particularly in 
light of BN’s weakening political position. Corruption is also encouraged by the presence 
of “‘middle men’ or agents seeking kickbacks or bribes,” that have thrived with the lack 
of transparency.111 While an earlier estimate quoted the commissions for arms deals to 
range from 10 to 20 percent, more recent queries regarding the SGPV-LCS deal suggest 
that the final contract was more than 30 percent greater than the original ‘ceiling’ cost of 
MYR6 billion.112 
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However, while corruption can result in the inflated cost of armaments, there is no 
evidence that corruption has actually led to more arms acquisitions. The level of funding 
did not increase to accommodate corruption, and hence, corruption appears to have a 
greater effect on the choice of equipment procured. Additionally, as more items are 
inflated in cost, there would be less armaments procured for the same level of funding. In 
this case, corruption has profited the elites and middle-men but not the MAF.  
Third, Malaysia has not been an exception to Huxley’s observation that Southeast 
Asian nations sought to “keep up with the neighbors” for national prestige, which is an 
aspect of domestic politics that occasionally draws on nationalistic appeals.113 Indeed, 
Jane’s has even judged that Malaysia’s “military procurement appears to be driven less 
by actual strategic requirements and more by foreign policy posturing.”114 This 
observation stems from the notion that greater national prestige can strengthen the foreign 
policy position of a country.  
The most cited example of a procurement being driven by prestige is that of the 
Scorpene submarines, which Malaysia ordered in 2002 during its surge of purchases after 
the EAFC. There were several hypotheses about what drove this acquisition. On the one 
hand, one could argue that these submarines were bought as a response to Singapore’s 
submarine purchase in the 1990s, as Chang postulated.115 Alternatively, submarines 
could be seen as the best platforms to counter Chinese submarines in the SCS, but the 
Scorpene purchase in 2002 pre-dates the recent militarization of the SCS by the Chinese, 
weakening this argument. At this point, further considerations of China as an external 
threat will be deferred, as the next section will cover external threats in more detail. On 
the other hand, regional analysts have suggested that these submarines were more of a 
political response than a military one,116 where “nationalist sentiments” had over-ridden 
threats as a driving force for procurement.117 Furthermore, Boyd highlights the 
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operational context, commenting that “light patrol craft” were more suitable for the 
region’s “shallow waters,” as compared to submarines,118 which were ultimately 
perceived as the “‘new bling,’ in the words of Bernard Loo.”119 Therefore, Malaysia can 
now count on the submarines to demonstrate its resolve in the SCS, but these notions 
were probably not in play when the procurements were justified. 
Still, the strength of regional prestige as a driving factor is relatively weak, as 
there do not appear to be many examples other than the submarines. Additionally, 
Malaysia’s moderate pattern of procurements in the last decade does not correlate with 
prestige being a big driver of arms procurement, as the quality and quantity of arms 
procured have not matched those of its neighbors. Hence, it is judged that while regional 
prestige has cropped up as a justification in the case of the submarines, it is on the whole 
not a strong driving factor for Malaysia. 
Therefore, with the weak influence of prestige, the prominence of non-defense 
political interests, and the possibly negative correlation between corruption and the 
quantity of arms acquisitions, it can be surmised that domestic politics is not a strong 
driving factor for arms procurement in Malaysia. Indeed, the strongest influence of 
domestic politics on arms procurement is through the obfuscation of the decision-making 
process. This manifests in the divergence of priorities caused by political concerns, 
corruption, and prestige that modifies the factor of resource availability, affecting how 
the allocated funds are actually spent. As Matthews and Maharani surmised, “Malaysia’s 
weapons procurement practices over the last two decades appear to have been based more 
on ad-hoc political dictate than on any overarching defense policy.”120  
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D. EXTERNAL THREATS 
Most scholars have explained threats to Southeast Asian nations as originating 
either from within the region or from without. This section first considers Malaysia’s 
intra-regional threats and then analyzes her extra-regional threats. 
1. Intra-Regional Threats 
An analysis of intra-regional threat perceptions leads to the conclusion that intra-
regional threats have not been a strong driving factor for arms procurement, as the 
concerns with regional neighbors stem more from rivalry than threats, and it is only 
territorial disputes that may have triggered arms acquisitions. 
Weiss describes the relationship between Malaysia and Indonesia to be that of 
“sibling rivalries,” where the “sheer depth and breadth of Malaysia-Indonesia ties…opens 
up a host of possible fault lines that have remained dormant.”121 Hence, even though 
there are extensive examples of bilateral cooperation, the relationship remains “brittle,” 
where “neither side seems sure of the other’s genuine goodwill.”122 The same can be said 
about relations with Singapore, with the added dimension of ethnically-based politics and 
the history of their separation.123 Still, some analysts have dismissed the notion that 
Malaysia may be attempting, through arms procurement, to “bridge the technology and 
firepower gap” between Singapore’s expensively-built military and their own, not only 
because the gap is significantly costly, but also because “Malaysia does not see Singapore 
as a potential battlefield foe.”124 
Hence, despite the intertwined history and rivalry amongst the nations, Malaysia 
has not had to translate this rivalry into perceived threats. As such, a Malaysian analyst 
commented that “Malaysia was faced with the peculiar luxury of preparing to counter an 
                                                 
121 Meredith Weiss, “Malaysia-Indonesia Bilateral Relations: Sibling Rivals in a Fraught Family,” in 
International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism, eds. N. Ganesan and 
Ramses Amer (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 172. 
122 Ibid., 187. 
123 K.S. Nathan, “Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation,” in Asian Security Practice: Material and 
Ideational Influences, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 525–26. 
124 Jayasankaran, “Call for Arms,” 20. 
 34 
enemy that, for all practical purposes, does not exist,”125 underscoring the sentiment that 
Malaysia was set in a “benign environment with few…threats.”126  
A more substantial manifestation of regional tensions is found in territorial 
disputes, and there is some evidence that intra-regional threats can drive arms 
procurement. Malaysia has “boundary disputes with all of its neighbors,” which have 
been developed along a range of trajectories ranging from peaceful negotiated settlements 
to naval standoffs.127 While some disputes, like Pedra Branca and the Ligitan and 
Sipadan Islands, have been arbitrated at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the 2009 
Ambalat Block dispute illustrated how easily territorial disputes led to skirmishes with 
physical damage to ships, even though no shots were fired.128 Were there arms 
procurement responses to such clashes? To answer this question, the orders for twelve 
vessels in 2014 could be viewed as responses. As the negotiations for the SGPV-LCS 
commenced in 2010, it is most likely that enforcing Malaysia’s territorial claims in the 
Ambalat area would be one key justification for the procurement.  
Malaysia’s sensitivity about territorial infringements echoes Sullivan’s insight 
that while Malaysia has prioritized economic development as the primary national goal, it 
“does not, however, imply that the country feels secure.”129 Two incidents are worth 
highlighting. First, during the 2013 Sulu conflict, Malaysia’s territorial integrity was 
violated, and the MOD announced that a “high capability radar would be procured,” 
illustrating how such border incidents can drive arms procurement.130 Second, the 
MH370 incident also emphasizes Malaysia’s attitude regarding territorial integrity. A 
Boeing 777 flaperon that washed up on Reunion Island in July 2015 all but confirmed the 
theory that the ill-fated aircraft had crossed over the Malaysian peninsula undetected, to 
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crash in the Indian Ocean.131 This incident revealed blind spots in the Malaysian radar 
coverage, and calls to equip the TUDM with more air defense radars were answered in 
the 2015 Defense Budget, again reflecting how arms procurement has been driven by the 
need to maintain territorial integrity.132 
On the whole, intra-regional threats are not a main driver of the arms procurement 
patterns in Southeast Asia. Indeed, any weak influence that intra-regional relations has on 
weapons acquisition tends to stem from territorial disputes and conflicts, rather than 
threat perception. 
2. Extra-Regional Threats 
Zooming out from the immediate Southeast Asian region, this section considers 
the degree that the rise of China has driven arms procurement in Malaysia, with the 
conclusion that it has thus far not played a significant role. This may be surprising since 
Malaysia is the only SCS claimant amongst the three countries studied which has had to 
handle China’s actions in the SCS directly. This section will argue that while Malaysia 
has not relied on arms procurements in responding to China, it has leveraged military 
deployments and diplomacy instead. To this end, this assessment has been developed by 
examining the issue from two perspectives: Sino-Malaysia foreign relations and 
Malaysia’s military response to the SCS Dispute. 
First, the Sino-Malaysian relationship is marked by economic interdependence 
and a track record of political convergence. Malaysia’s focus on economic growth led to 
a “logic of economics and trade (that) underscored Malaysia’s initial approaches to 
Beijing,” that led to Malaysia overtaking Singapore as “China’s largest trading partner in 
ASEAN” in 2003.133 Since then, trade has continued rising at an average of 15.7 percent 
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between 2002 and 2012.134 With Kuala Lumpur’s strategy of “trade bandwagoning,” 
their bilateral relationship continued to strengthen. In 2013, another milestone was 
reached as bilateral ties were elevated to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” level 
and the Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park was opened.135 
Politically, Malaysia was the first ASEAN nation to recognize China in 1974, and 
since then, as Liow observed, there has been a “remarkable convergence of the 
worldviews of both Malaysian and Chinese leaders,” most prominently displayed with 
PM Mahathir’s frequent criticisms of the West. For instance, China supported Mahathir’s 
“vocal leadership” of “opposition to American hegemony and unilateralism” that 
resonated with Beijing’s concerns.136 While subsequent leaders have adopted a less 
combative tone, they have not backed off from rebuking the West on occasion. In 2008, 
when the U.S. State Department threatened to “oppose any politically-motivated 
investigation…of Mr. Anwar [Ibrahim],” a prominent opposition leader, Malaysia sent a 
protest note back stating that Malaysia “did not expect that overture by the U.S.”137 The 
resilience of the Sino-Malaysian relationship was also evidenced when the Chinese 
government distanced itself from the Chinese public’s disapproval of the Malaysian 
government’s response to the disappearance of MH370 in 2014.138 In May 2015, 
Malaysia also deferred to China in refusing the entry of Hong Kong’s Occupy Central 
student democracy activist, Joshua Wong, for a conference in Penang.139   
It is, therefore, with this context of economic cooperation and political alignment 
that one can appreciate Malaysia’s diplomatic approach to the SCS dispute, in which 
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Malaysia has been accused of breaking ranks with ASEAN to prioritize its “special 
relationship” with China.140 This observation arose most stridently after Malaysia’s 
muted response to revelations that the Chinese Navy had conducted maneuvers near the 
James Shoal off Sarawak in 2013.141 This was surprising to observers as Malaysia 
appeared to have compromised its own sovereignty to avoid upsetting China. Even if 
Malaysia was not strong enough to respond by force, it could still have registered 
publicly that such a development was not welcome. 
Second, the tame diplomatic response to China’s actions in the SCS has been 
balanced by stronger military-based moves. One means has been defense diplomacy, 
where after China’s repeated visit to James Shoal in 2014 with its largest and newest 
amphibious assault ship, the TLDM Chief met with his U.S. counterpart, agreeing to 
“step up U.S. naval visits to Malaysia.”142 Another means has been the actual 
deployment of Malaysian military forces, where in mid-2015, when a Chinese Coast 
Guard ship anchored off the South Luconia Shoals, Malaysia sent a TLDM and a 
Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) vessel, to monitor the Chinese ship, 
signaling a firmer tone.143 Of course, these escalated responses still fall short when 
compared to the protests and drastic measures by Vietnam and the Philippines, such the 
running aground of a derelict vessel, Sierra Madre on Ayungin Shoal off the Philippine 
island of Palawan back in 1999.  
The third possible means of military response would have been to embark on 
arms procurement to meet China’s threat, but Malaysia’s stance up to 2013 does not 
support this notion. To explore such a possibility further, it is reasoned that if Malaysia 
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wanted to procure capabilities to address the SCS dispute, the MAF would seek better 
maritime awareness of their EEZs and better force projection of forces to demonstrate 
national resolve. Hence, suitable procurements include maritime awareness assets, force 
projection platforms, and a responsive show of presence capabilities.  
In terms of maritime awareness assets, naval vessels and Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
(MPA) were ordered between 2000 and 2002 and between 2012 and 2014. In the first 
time span, assets like six German MEKO-A100 NGPVs, Ocean Master radars, and two 
Scorpene Submarines were ordered. A decade later, improved MPA radars and a back-to-
back purchase of six SGPV-LCS and six MSCs were ordered. This latest set of twelve 
vessels was significant as the TLDM had never augmented their fleet at such a rate 
before. For force projection, there were fewer purchases; Malaysia only invested in four 
Airbus A400Ms transport aircraft in 2005 and twelve EC725 helicopters in 2010. 
Meanwhile, requirements for a Landing Ship Tank or a Multirole Support Ship that could 
project forces with sufficient logistics support were deferred.144 Finally, as the capability 
for responsive show of presence is typically fulfilled by fighter jets, Malaysia’s 2002 
purchase of eighteen Su-30MKMs was most significant, particularly in light of the 
aircraft’s much-vaunted long combat radius.  
While these arms procurements fall within the postulated types, the timings of 
these orders do not support a strong correlation with China and the SCS dispute. On the 
one hand, most of the relevant equipment procured in the first 2000–2005 surge of arm 
procurements happened during China’s ‘charm offensive’ in SEA, including the signing 
of the Declaration on the Conduct with ASEAN in 2002. Indeed, these purchases were 
more likely to make up for the halt in procurement during the EAFC.145 On the other 
hand, there was a seven year gap between the 2007 escalation of the larger SCS dispute 
till 2014, when orders for the twelve naval vessels were initiated. While these later orders 
might be linked to the Chinese visits to James Shoal starting in 2013, it was noted that the 
negotiations for the orders started as early as 2010, showing that the Chinese actions in 
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the SCS were unlikely to be the main driving factor.146 Furthermore, when one considers 
that the Su-30MKMs—which could technically patrol the SCS—were eventually basing 
at Gong Kedak,147 leaving it relatively far from Malaysia’s SCS claims that were nearer 
to Sabah and Sarawak, it leads to the conclusion that other factors had influenced the 
basing decision for the Sukhois, and China was not the foremost concern.  
Therefore, Malaysia has responded to China through aggressive diplomatic 
moves, defense diplomacy, and military deployments, but it has not responded in arms 
procurement. Thus, with respect to balancing against external threats, the only causal 
chain that has been observed lies in the realm of intra-regional territorial disputes, which 
has driven arms procurement in Malaysia.  
E. FORCE MODERNIZATION 
Force modernization has been a driver for MAF arms acquisitions more to replace 
obsolete equipment, rather than to keep up with the military technology. Nevertheless, 
even for the purpose of obsolescence management, force modernization was still a weak 
factor, as the following examples illustrate. 
The justification to acquire new weapons systems in order to replace older 
systems that have become obsolete has been a common refrain in Malaysia, albeit with 
mixed success in terms of actual procurements being approved. On the one hand, in 2010, 
the TUDM managed to confirm the procurement of EC-725 helicopters to replace its 
“ageing and depleted Sikorsky S-61 Nuri utility helicopters.”148 Similarly, the TDM 
succeeded in securing funds to procure the AV-8 IFV in 2011 to replace their “obsolete 
fleet of SIMBAS and CONDOR AFVs.”149 On the other hand, in 2008, when the TLDM 
chief asserted the need to procure replacement surface-to-air missile systems for “its 
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existing and ageing Starburst system,” there was no procurement decision made in that 
case.150 Beyond these anecdotal incidents, the search for a new MRCA to replace the 
MiG-29s is elaborated below to better describe the relative weakness of the force 
modernization as a driving factor for procurement. 
Indeed, replacing the MiG-29 was a modernization requirement that the TUDM 
had sought to address since the late 2000s, particularly because the costs of operating and 
maintaining the aircrafts were escalating. As part of the process to select a new MRCA, 
the TUDM attempted to retire the MiG-29 in 2010, but this initiative had to be aborted. 
As it turned out, the Malaysian government subsequently reversed their position, 
deciding to extend the service life of eight MiG-29s till 2015, saying that it was less 
costly than investing in a replacement. Therefore, while the factor of force modernization 
to replace an existing platform that was approaching obsolescence had moved the MOD 
to initiate the arms procurement process, the factor was not strong enough to culminate in 
a replacement being procured. Indeed, the MiG-29 replacement program was 
deprioritized when compared against other competing demands, reflecting the relative 
strength of the resource availability and domestic politics factors.151  
The trend of seeking to replace obsolete equipment reflects the prevalent, yet 
weak influence of the force modernization factor. Finally, this phenomenon was also 
observed by Sullivan, who suggests that ever since the arms procurement surge that 
occurred between 20002005, the declining priority on defense has led to Malaysia being 
“unable or unwilling to invest in a robust defense beyond inventory replacement.”152 
F. SUMMARY 
The arms procurement trend of Malaysia can be described to have a surge of arms 
procurement in the 2000–2005 time span and generally restrained arms acquisitions ever 
since. Amidst the reduced levels of arms acquisition, which of the four factors have been 
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most prevalent? Based on the discussion, the strongest factor driving arms procurement 
in Malaysia is resource availability. Primarily borne out of the analysis of empirical data, 
the deeper trend observed was that the percentage share of GDP spent on defense has 
been on the decline, signaling a trend of de-prioritizing defense at a national level. 
Meanwhile, the domestic politics factor shows a mixed influence, with different effects 
for the three facets of domestic politics. Indeed, as much as corruption affects 
procurement decision-making, it is not apparent that it drives greater levels of 
procurement that would not have been made otherwise. For external threats, it is the 
unresolved territorial disputes at the intra-regional level that are most likely to drive the 
purchase of weapon systems. Finally, force modernization is a positive but weak factor in 
arms procurement for Malaysia.  
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III. INDONESIA 
This chapter will analyze how the four proposed causal relationships affect arms 
procurement in Indonesia in the years 2000–2015. Using the same approach as Chapter 
II, a review of Indonesia’s arms procurement record since the EAFC is first presented to 
highlight key combatants and capabilities that have been procured.  
A. REVIEW OF ARMS PROCUREMENT  
Indonesia’s average growth in defense spending was 9.1 percent since 2000—the 
largest growth amongst Southeast Asian countries since the EAFC.153 This has resulted 
in sustained arms procurement for all three services, with Figure 5 providing an overview 
of arms acquisitions since 2000. 
The immediate impression from Figure 5 is that the quantity of arms acquisitions 
conducted by Indonesia is visibly greater than that of Malaysia, quantified by the 66 arms 
purchases recorded as compared to 38 by Malaysia, underscoring the assessment that 
Malaysia has been restrained in the procurement of arms. The Tentera Nasional Indonesia 
(TNI) has added advanced fighter jets like the Su-27/30 and the F-16; land-based combat 
systems like the Leopard MBTs, ASTROS II MRSs, and AH-64E Apache Attack 
Helicopters; and Sigma frigates, Type-209 submarines and Landing Platform Docks for 
the navy. These systems introduced long-range power projection capabilities like the 
Sukhois and MRS systems, as well as new capabilities like the submarines and the attack 
helicopters to the TNI, laying the foundation for a greater mix of capabilities. Three 
observations of TNI arms procurement trends since 2000 can be made. 
First, in terms of temporal distribution, one can observe two periods of increased 
arms procurement: 2002–2004 and 2008–2012. While these peaks of defense 
procurement tie in with spikes in military expenditure to be discussed in Figures 6 and 7, 
it is highlighted that the two time periods reveal a change in focus areas. In the earlier 
2002–2004 period, the purchase of eight naval vessels signaled an emphasis on the 
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maritime domain in comparison to the other services; whereas in the 2008–2012 time 
period, a broad-based approach was observed, with key combatants like advanced fighter 
jets, MBTs and submarines were purchased for all three services. 
Figure 5.  Indonesia: Main Arms Procurements since 2000 
 
Adapted from “SIPRI Arms Trade Register,” Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, accessed May 16, 2015, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade 
/page/trade_register.php; Jane’s IHS Database, Jane’s IHS, accessed May 25, 2015, 
http://janes.ihs.com.  
Second, the TNI has been procuring a wide assortment of different systems, even 
within a specific weapon type. For instance, there were seven instances of Armored 
Personnel Carriers (APC) and IFV procurements from 2003–2014, sometimes in small 
quantities of twenty or less. Similarly, its fighter aircraft fleet now includes “a mixed 
cornucopia” of Russian Sukhois as well as American F-16s, with training conducted on 
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South Korean T-50is.154 Besides the fact that this pattern of procurement drives up 
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs because of the need to stock a wide diversity 
of spare parts, acquisition funds would also be shunted towards O&M, undercutting arms 
procurement efforts. Indeed, in 2006, the TNI was already operating “173 different 
weapon systems from 17 different countries,” and the pattern of arms procurement after 
2006 suggests that a similar situation still persists in the TNI.155  
Third, and most critical with respect to military effectiveness, there was 
significant augmentation to the TNI’s fleets of fighter aircraft and land armored vehicles. 
From 2008 to 2012, twelve Sukhois, 24 ex-USAF F-16 Block 52s, and sixteen South 
Korean T-50i jet trainers were purchased. This meant that the TNI-AU added 52 jet 
fighter class aircraft to their fleet of 48—more than doubling it in numbers and providing 
it with more modern capabilities. Similarly, the land arsenal saw the introduction of 
Leopard MBTs and attack helicopters in the form of the AH-64Es, the latest models of 
the Apache line—capabilities that were not present prior to 2012. This was combined 
with a significant order of MRSs, further augmenting the strike capability of the 
Indonesian Army (TNI-AD). In contrast, one could argue that maritime development 
appeared to be more restrained, for although five surface vessels (two Sigma-105 frigates 
and three ex-Bruneian corvettes) and three Type-209 submarines were ordered from 
2012–2013, the overall quantity of Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) and surface vessels is 
still significantly lacking in the context of the demands of trying to patrol a 740,000 
square mile archipelago. Moreover, while two Sigma-105 frigates were added to the 
existing fleet of four Sigma-90 frigates, this was still significantly short of the initial 
target of “40 Sigma vessels to be procured by 2015,” suggesting that this aggressive rate 
of arms procurements were still short of that envisaged by the defense planners.156 
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B. RESOURCE AVAILABILITY 
Analyzing the defense economics of Indonesia reveals that resource availability 
was a reasonably strong factor in driving the TNI arms build-up since 2000. This 
assessment is developed from two main observations.157 First, there has been a strong 
correlation between the growth of Indonesian GDP and military expenditure, as shown in 
Figure 6. Before focusing on the defense outlays, one should first appreciate the 
magnitude of Indonesia’s economic recovery after having suffered the “steepest 
depreciation of all the crisis currencies” during the EAFC.158 Indeed, on the back of 
political and market reforms, Indonesia registered the strongest economic growth 
amongst Southeast Asian states. Its economy has grown an average of 13.3% annually 
since 2000–2014, with per capita GDP rising dramatically from $790 to $3,500.159  
Figure 6.  Indonesia: GDP and Military Expenditure Post-EAFC  
 
Adapted from “World Bank Database,” World Bank, accessed May 27, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org and “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, accessed May 13, 2015, http://www.sipri.org/
research/armaments/milex/milex_database. 
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In tandem with the strong economic performance, the orange line on Figure 6 
depicting military expenditure has been on an upward trend that has tracked closely to the 
GDP, showing that part of the resources arising from GDP growth has been directed to 
the TNI. The consistency of the correlation can also be observed as the slight decline in 
the GDP in 2013–2014 was also accompanied by a dip in military expenditure in 2014.  
Second, while the Indonesian government has generally not prioritized defense 
highly as a share of GDP, it has made efforts to allocate greater proportions of the budget 
for defense on occasion. Looking first at the defense share of the GDP, indicated by the 
red line in Figure 7, it has maintained an average of 0.81 percent since the EAFC, 
revealing the low priority assigned to defense by the Indonesian government. The highest 
the Indonesian government spent was 0.95 percent and 0.96 percent in 2004 and 2013 
respectively, but these were still short of 1 percent. Hence, despite the pledges made by 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to “increase defense spending to 1.5 percent of 
GDP by 2014,” no tangible results were achieved by that indicator.160 Still, such a 
conclusion appears incongruent with respect to the prolific acquisition activities shown in 
Figure 5. 
Instead, studying military expenditure as a share of the budget provides different 
insights, as it can be seen that there have been occasional efforts to spend more on the 
TNI. Specifically, in 2004 and 2013, there were peaks of 4.9 percent and 4.8 percent 
respectively, where the governments were able to push defense spending above its 
average of 3.9 percent of government spending in the years 2001–2014. These two peaks 
also correspond with the observed surges of procurements in 2002–2004 and 2008–2012 
illustrated in Figure 5. Hence, even though defense spending did not exceed 1 percent of 
the GDP, the Indonesian government was making changes to increase military spending 
as a share of government spending, indicating attempts to prioritize defense when it was 
possible to do so. Additionally, when these allocations were increased, they manifested in 
increased arms procurement.  
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Figure 7.  Indonesia: Military Expenditure as a Share of GDP and National 
Budget 
 
Adapted from “World Bank Database,” World Bank, accessed May 27, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org and “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, accessed May 13, 2015, http://www.sipri.org/
research/armaments/milex/milex_database.  
Beyond this analysis of government budget allocation, two further aspects on 
Indonesian defense funding need to be clarified for a more comprehensive appreciation of 
the TNI’s situation. First, Mietzner, among other scholars, records how the TNI had “a 
long history of raising its own funds,” with units directed to “[set] up independent 
businesses and cooperatives that could help with the financing of military operations” 
since the 1950s.161 While these non-governmental funds appear to provide an alternative 
source of capital that could be funneled into arms procurement, this has not been the case. 
On the one hand, some studies have highlighted that the proportion of unofficial funding 
only accounts for about “1.5-3.0 percent of the government defense budget” instead of 
earlier estimates of up to 70 percent, as previous estimations calculated the gross 
revenues of the enterprises instead of just the net income.162 On the other hand, these 
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enterprises have been “local” in nature,163 where military enterprises “lease land to 
private companies” and “charge private enterprises for security.”164 Hence, even though 
TNI financial resources are more diverse than other militaries, these alternative channels 
do not contribute towards arms procurement, and they are thus not a relevant factor here. 
Second, while the military enterprises have not contributed to arms procurement, 
“banks in France, Russia, and Switzerland have provided Jakarta with credit to purchase 
defense items,” making foreign loans an important source of alternative funding.165 For 
example, “in 2007, Russia provided USD 1 billion in credit facilities that Indonesia used 
to purchase Sukhoi fighters,” hence, Jakarta had succeeded in getting “foreign suppliers 
to finance big ticket purchases.”166 As such, the availability of alternative foreign funds 
can potentially help to close arms deals that therefore encourage acquisitions. Still, such 
deals are essentially loans, and Jakarta will eventually need to repay them. It was thus 
unsurprising that in 2011, President Yudhoyono called for KEMHAN167 to “rely less on 
foreign loans,”168 although this habit would take a while to wean off as the Leopard tanks 
purchased in 2012 were still financed through foreign loans.169 Furthermore, “since 2013, 
about a dozen big banks” have moved to provide credit for about eight contracts for TNI 
equipment, reflecting the continued exploitation of foreign loans.170  
In all, despite the harder impact that the EAFC had on Indonesia, its admirable 
economic recovery has fueled increased military expenditure up until 2012–2013. Even if 
the acquisition patterns have resulted in an overly diverse collection of weapons systems, 
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the very act of completing arms purchases is the relevant point here. For the moment, the 
government remains optimistic in pledging to support increased defense spending, and 
the current administration makes a similar pledge to increase the defense share of GDP to 
1.5 percent, with a renewed timeline of 2019.171  
C. DOMESTIC POLITICS 
This section will argue that domestic politics is an important driver for Indonesian 
arms procurement, although the three themes outlined in the introduction may act on the 
causal relationship in different ways. First, fluctuations of the military share of the 
government budget in Figure 7 shows that government spending allocation is hotly 
contested and the TNI is vulnerable to competing government priorities, meaning that it 
is not always able to dictate higher levels of military funding. In 2013, the Indonesian 
government allocated 33.2 percent of its budget to social development infrastructure such 
as housing, education, health, and social protection, which was more than six times the 
amount allocated to defense.172 
Such contestation should not come as a surprise given the military reforms that 
were undertaken to try to remove the TNI from its ‘dwifungsi’ role in politics of the New 
Order. However, many observers point out that the TNI actually remains an important 
political player because military reforms have failed to “eliminate remaining reserves of 
military power,” illustrated by the revival of the TNI-AD territorial command, the 
persistence of military businesses, and the “failure to civilianize the defense 
bureaucracy.”173 In each of these three areas, the TNI retained a “latent” power in 
holding on to levers of political influence.174 First, the “reactivation of the military 
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territorial command” in 2005175 “not only anchored the military deeply in local politics, 
but also allowed it to raise funds at all levels of Indonesia’s civilian administration.”176 
Second, the failure of President Yudhoyono to follow through with reforms to close down 
military businesses “bolstered the (TNI’s) fiscal independence.”177 Third, the fact that the 
KEMHAN remains “overwhelmingly staffed with military officers,” topped off with the 
introduction of “the new post of deputy minister” staffed by “an influential active duty 
military officer,” also reflects the pervasive presence of the military in the purportedly 
civilian KEMHAN.178 
The apparent perpetuation of TNI’s involvement in politics presents a conundrum, 
as if the TNI has held on to substantial political leverage, why have they not won greater 
allocations of the budget for defense spending? Two reasons are at play here. First, 
KEMHAN has not been able to function as a coordinated and centrally-rationalized 
institution. Indeed, the KEMHAN has been described as simply collating the “shopping 
list of the individual services” in lieu of a “procurement process,” reflecting that it has not 
been able to drive the TNI arms build-up in a meaningful manner.179 Second, the TNI has 
had to compete with the POLRI (Indonesian National Police), their rival security 
institution which was carved out of the ABRI180 after the fall of the New Order. As it 
turned out, law enforcement activities secured about half of what defense institutions 
were allocated at the national level.181 Even in the realms of alternative funding, the 
POLRI has also developed an “entrepreneurial impulse” and it has attracted some of the 
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“ethnic Chinese capital” that was once “earmarked exclusively for the military.”182 
Indeed, President Yudhoyono’s “failure to reform police and military businesses” also 
“bolstered the two institutions’ fiscal independence.”183 Therefore, contestation for 
funding at multiple levels is an important facet of domestic politics that influences how 
funds are obtained for arms acquisitions. The contest is an on-going tussle, as recent 
moves by the TNI towards “regaining some of the internal security responsibilities” 
suggest efforts to justify wrestling resource allocations from the POLRI.184 
The second broad aspect of domestic politics relates to corruption, which has 
influenced how arms are procured in the TNI, without actually driving increased levels of 
procurements. Indonesia has not fared well in corruption assessments, ranking 107th out 
of 175 nations according to the 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index.185 Focusing 
specifically at Defense, Transparency International’s 2012 Government Defense Anti-
Corruption Index places Indonesia in the second-worst category of “Very High Risk,” 
highlighting concerns about “pervasive and poorly controlled use of agents, a lack of 
transparency surrounding financing packages, and weak control of subcontractors.”186 
These rankings are further substantiated as corruption has been acknowledged by ex-DM 
Sudarsono, who claimed that “up to 40 percent of procurement proposals could be mark-
ups.”187 Additionally, KEMHAN audits have also “found rampant irregularities,” 
including the alleged overspending of “some $134.9 million in the procurement of a 
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) worth $405 million” in 2012.188 Even the 
purchase of 24 ex-USAF F-16s in 2011 was based on the advice of an influential 
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“middleman.”189 These fairly-recent incidents attest to the fact that corruption remains 
closely associated with arms procurements, and efforts to combat corruption have had 
limited success.190  
Similar to Malaysia, there is no evidence that the presence of corruption has led to 
increased arms procurement for the TNI, but corruption has instead influenced the choice 
and quantity of arms acquired. On the one hand, Schreer notes that “corruption continues 
to create incentives for various interest groups in and outside the TNI to continue buying 
overseas,” forcing the usage of foreign currency.191 On the other hand, the larger 
implication of marked-up arms acquisition is that it potentially reduces the overall 
quantity of arms that can be procured. Such “corruption-driven acquisition of weapon 
systems delinked from defense policy and strategic requirements” can sap limited 
financial resources and negatively impact the objectives of arms procurement efforts.192 
The third facet of domestic politics relates to the desire for national prestige. 
Indonesia has traditionally been the biggest polity in ASEAN, accounting for more than 
40 percent of ASEAN’s population and land area, and its founding role in the creation of 
ASEAN adds further credence to its mentality that it should have the prestige associated 
with that of a regional leader. In this light, it can be appreciated why analysts have opined 
that “the scale and scope of Indonesia’s arms deals…suggests that the country is pursuing 
an ambitious drive to become a major power in the Indo-Pacific region.”193 At the 
moment, the prospects of Indonesia attaining the power and status of regional powers like 
China and India are still poor at this stage, as Schreer points out that Indonesia often 
“conflates new shiny equipment with real military capability.”194 Still, this comment is 
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probably unfair as it is more likely the case that Indonesia has prioritized the symbolic 
effect of arms procurements instead of the simplistic conflation charged by Schreer.  
To that end, the two most commonly raised examples of symbolic purchases 
relate to the TNI’s efforts to procure submarines and MBTs. Recalling Boyd’s comment 
that some ASEAN nations including Indonesia had a “tendency to put image ahead of 
practicality,” he argued that the “shallow waters” in the region required “light patrol 
craft” instead of submarines.195 By the same token, Jane’s also observes that “the fact 
that other Southeast Asian nations are in the process of acquiring submarines appears to 
have sufficiently politicized the issue to persuade the government to press ahead” with 
acquiring submarines.196 As for the MBTs, Yohanes Sulaiman from the Indonesian 
Defense University quipped that the defense establishment seemed to reason that since 
the “other countries have these shiny tanks, we should have them too.”197 Indeed, other 
than questions about the suitability of using such heavy tanks in Indonesia’s archipelagic 
geography, the fact that “the tanks delivered are believed to not include fire-control 
systems” truly buttresses the notion that it was more important to parade a shiny new 
MBT for appearances only.198 
In all, the procurement of symbolic weapons like the submarines, MBTs, and 
other systems like the “very expensive ‘airborne MBT’” in the AH-64E, reflect the 
degree that the desire for regional prestige is a driver of arms purchases.199 At the same 
time, the desire for regional prestige should also be seen in the context of Indonesia’s 
larger ambitions of regional leadership, as well as the significant challenges the TNI faces 
in enforcing territorial integrity.   
Taken as a whole, the domestic politics factor is significant for Indonesian arms 
procurement, although the facets of budget contestation, corruption, and prestige can 
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work in opposing ways. Indeed, contestation for budget resources reflects the importance 
for the TNI to hold on to its political influence if it is to continue procuring more 
weapons. Yet, the endemic corruption tends to divert those resources into the hands of 
middlemen, inflating prices that crowd out other purchases. Finally, the persuasive 
instincts of regional leadership have demonstrably driven arms procurements towards 
shiny equipment even if they may not be operationally useful. 
D. EXTERNAL THREATS 
Indonesia’s unique position as the largest Southeast Asian nation and its 
ambitions to be a regional leader create a different set of dynamics in their external threat 
context.  
1. Intra-Regional Threats 
Before analyzing whether unresolved disputes or threat perception could have 
driven arms procurement for the TNI, it is useful to consider some characteristics of 
Indonesian foreign policy. First, Indonesian foreign policy can be described as being less 
rooted in realism than in liberalism, as “Indonesia puts a lot of faith in the ability of 
ASEAN to prevent the outbreak of conflicts and to contain bilateral frictions.”200 Indeed, 
beyond ASEAN, Indonesia has also engaged in active defense diplomacy, in an effort to 
“reduce the country’s security dependence and expand its strategic partnerships.”201 
Second, while the maintenance of internal security continues to be important, it has 
become apparent that “the international environment facing Indonesia is becoming 
increasingly complex.”202 As a result, there is increasing recognition of the need to build 
“balanced…armed forces” to address potential foreign policy issues.203 Given the nature 
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of Indonesian foreign policy, this section moves to discuss regional threat perceptions 
and unresolved disputes in turn. 
Despite the increasing complexity of the international environment, regional 
threat perceptions are not a significant challenge for Indonesia, for two reasons. First, 
Indonesia’s archipelagic make-up means that “a land invasion of Indonesia is extremely 
unlikely,” even as it “compounds the TNI’s challenge to control its vast territorial waters” 
and “airspace.”204 Second, “Indonesia has enjoyed a relatively benign security 
environment” that has been built upon the “cooperative multilateral processes [of] 
ASEAN.”205 This peaceful outlook has also been expressed in the 2008 Defense White 
Paper that “foresees no external military threat in the next 15 years,” and this is 
manifested by the perception that “Indonesia is distinctly lacking in hard-power 
assets.”206 Indeed, although Malaysia remains the primary rival for regional leadership 
and Singapore continues to pester Indonesia on transboundary issues like haze and piracy 
in the Malacca Straits, these neighbors do not represent military threats. 
Similar to Malaysia, the more tangible foreign policy issue which may drive arms 
procurement relates to unresolved territorial disputes. As of 2012, “Indonesia still has 
over ten unresolved maritime boundary disputes with neighboring states,”207 with only 
one dispute resolved with Singapore in 2014 since then.208 The most prominent disputes, 
however, have been with Malaysia. In 2002, Indonesia lost an ICJ ruling for sovereignty 
over Ligitan and Sipadan in the Celebes Sea. The ignominy of this ‘defeat’ led to a 
determination by Indonesia to more strongly assert its claim for the nearby Ambalat 
Block, rather than leaving its territorial claim in the hands of an independent court. This 
stance led to both nations deploying military vessels, resulting in one ship being damaged 
amidst an escalation of events in 2005.209 Elsewhere, land border disputes with Malaysia 
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in Camar Bulan in Kalimantan have also led to sensitive escalation of tensions, even 
though there were actually “few cases of border violations between Indonesia and 
Malaysia in 2011.”210  
Have these territorial disputes driven arms procurement? When considering the 
time periods of the territorial spats and the arms acquisitions, no distinct pattern can be 
discerned. For instance, while one could potentially link the 2004 buys of the Sigma-90 
frigates and Landing Platform Decks (LPDs) to the loss of Sipadan and Ligitan in 2002, 
there was no evidence supporting that hypothesis. Additionally, after tensions rose in 
2005 in the Ambalat, there was no significant maritime procurement made until 2012, as 
shown in Figure 5.  
Therefore, although the Indonesian arms build-up from 2000–2015 was the most 
significant in scale compared to Malaysia or Singapore, these procurements have not 
been related to concerns over territorial disputes or regional threat perceptions. While 
Indonesia is cognizant that the increasing complexity of the international environment 
would still require a reasonable defense force, the build-up of this force has not been 
driven by isolated disputes or an underlying regional threat perception.  
2. Extra-Regional Threats 
This section argues that the rise of China was not the driving factor for significant 
Indonesian arms procurement efforts. Instead, Beijing’s actions in the SCS created 
uncertainties about the EEZ off the Natunas Islands, and such concerns have not 
dampened arms procurement activities that were already underway. This section will 
examine the issue from two perspectives: Sino-Indonesian foreign relations and 
Indonesia’s military response to the SCS dispute. 
Indonesian scholar Rizal Sukma considers Indonesia’s management of “its 
relations with the People’s Republic of China (to be) one of the most difficult challenges 
in Indonesian Foreign Policy,” reflecting the tension between seeking the economic 
benefits of a relationship with China and worrying about the uncertainties regarding 
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China’s regional intentions.211 Indonesia’s relations with China are plagued with distrust 
rooted in Chinese support for the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) and the legacy of 
Indonesia’s bloody crackdown on the PKI in 1965, leading to more than twenty years of 
frozen bilateral ties until its restoration in August 1990.212 Ironically, it was only in the 
wake of more severe anti-Chinese protests during the EAFC that relations took on a 
positive trajectory as both Beijing and Jakarta managed to prevent the protests from 
“getting out of control.”213 As such, even though the two nations have upgraded the 
status of their relationship to being Comprehensive Strategic Partners in 2013, Sino-
Indonesian relations have not quite reached the same ‘special’ status as that of Sino-
Malaysian relations.214  
Despite the complex tenor of their bilateral relationship, both countries have 
nevertheless seized the economic opportunities that have emerged, with China becoming 
Indonesia’s largest global trading partner, accounting for 28.4 percent of Indonesia’s 
trade activity.215 In fact, bilateral trade in 2013 was USD 22.6 billion, an impressive six-
fold increase since 2003.216 Unfortunately, the bustling economic relationship is also 
marked by difficulties, as it is becoming more apparent that the bilateral trade imbalance 
has been favoring China, with Beijing only investing “because of their interests in the 
energy sector,” which has also generated “less employment opportunities in comparison 
with investments in the manufacturing sector.”217 Worse, “only 6 percent of Chinese 
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investment in Indonesia had actually materialized,” causing President Jokowi to “bluntly 
[state] that he wanted the relationship to ‘materialize into more concrete outcomes’… in 
trade and investment.”218  Recently, in May 2015, Jokowi took the further step of 
deciding to sink one Chinese vessel that had been caught for illegal fishing in 2009, an 
act calculated to communicate resolve to the Chinese as Indonesia had initially delayed 
sinking Chinese vessels for fear of offending Beijing.219 
With this backdrop of the tenuous Sino-Indonesian relationship, it is in the 
maritime domain where bilateral ties have sunk the deepest. Although Indonesia is not 
one of the claimants in the SCS territorial dispute, Jakarta has had to seek clarifications 
from Beijing regarding “why [China] included Indonesia’s rich Natunas gas field in its 
maps of claims to a broad swath of the SCS” since as early as 1994.220 China never 
formally replied and hence, Jakarta was understandably up in arms when Beijing 
formally submitted their “nine-dashed lines” claim for the first time to the United Nations 
in 2009, still including part of the Indonesian EEZ off the Natunas Islands.221 With “one 
of the world’s largest offshore gas fields”222 at stake, Indonesia’s repeated attempts to 
diplomatically clarify China’s intentions since 2010 were still unsuccessful.223 Indonesia 
also took offence at the Chinese declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone 
(ADIZ) over the East China Sea in 2013, warning that Indonesia would “not accept a 
                                                 
218 Prashanth Parameswaran, “China and Indonesia under Jokowi: Show Me the Money,” The 
Diplomat, January 28, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/china-and-indonesia-under-jokowi-show-me-
the-money/.  
219 Tama Salim, “RI Flexes Muscle, Sinks Chinese Boat, a Big One,” The Jakarta Post, May 20, 
2015, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/05/20/ri-flexes-muscle-sinks-chinese-boat-a-big-one.html.  
220 Donald Zagoria, “Joining ASEAN,” in Vietnam Joins the World, eds. James W. Morley and 
Masashi Nishihara (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 159. 
221 Carlyle Thayer, Southeast Asia: Patterns of Security Cooperation (Barton, AU: Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute, 2010), 34. 
222 Pai Ching Koong, Southeast Asian Countries’ Perceptions of China’s Military Modernization 
(Washington, D.C.: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1999), 10. 
223 Andrew Marshall, “Remote, Gas-Rich Islands on Indonesia’s South China Sea Frontline,” Reuters, 
August 25, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/26/us-southchinasea-indonesia-natuna-insigh-
idUSKBN0GP1WA20140826.   
 60 
similar zone if it [was] adopted in the SCS.”224 Indonesia’s progressively more cynical 
view was exemplified by then-TNI Commander General Moeldoko’s comment that, 
“everyone has an opinion that China is a threat to the neighborhood,” one of the first 
public statements referring to China as a threat.225 
The second perspective to analyze the gravity of China’s threat is to consider 
Indonesia’s military responses to China’s actions in the SCS. With China stonewalling 
Jakarta’s attempts to clarify how the “nine-dashed lines” affect Indonesia’s EEZ,226 the 
TNI has responded through the increased deployment of military forces to the Natunas. 
Key assets planned to be based at the Natunas include half of its new fleet of AH-64E 
Apache helicopters,227 together with F-16s and Sukhois on the Ranai Airbase that was 
being upgraded—a significant increase in the forward deployment of forces.228 Beyond 
the deployment of forces as a show of resolve, has Indonesia reacted to China by the 
procurement of arms depicted in Figure 5? If this had occurred, one should find the 
procurement of maritime awareness assets, force projection platforms, and responsive 
show of presence capabilities as a response to China.  
A study of TNI’s procurements will show attempts to invest in all three areas. To 
enhance its maritime awareness capability, platforms that have been procured include 
four used Australian Nomad Searchmaster MPA and Ocean Master radars in 2001, and 
four Sigma-90 frigates between 2004 and 2005. To augment these basic capabilities, a 
higher rate of procurement was observed post-2008, with an additional CN-235 MPA, 
two Sigma-105 frigates, and three Type-209 submarines in 2012, followed by three ex-
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Bruneian Yarrow F2000 corvettes in 2013.229 For force projection, the TNI ordered four 
South Korean LPD multirole vessels in 2004. These Makassar class vessels are designed 
to carry 507 troops, 13 combat vehicles, and two helicopters, creating the capability to 
project forces across the archipelago.230 Airlift assets were also improved, with six NC-
212s ordered in 2009, six C-212s and nine CN-295s in 2012, and four ex-RAAF C-130s 
in 2013, providing a 90 percent increase in air lift capacity.231 In addition, helicopter 
assets were augmented with six Mi-17 in 2005 and six EC-725 in 2012.  
Finally, when considering fighter aircraft for the show of presence, the TNI-AU 
started slowly with the ad-hoc purchase of just four Sukhois (two Su-27 and two Su-30) 
through a barter trade by President Megawati in 2008.232 However, the pace increased 
significantly with six Sukhois each in 2008 and 2012, and 24 ex-USAF F-16 Block 52s in 
2012. These acquisitions of fighter-class aircraft more than doubled the size of its fleet, 
although these assets would need to be dispersed across the archipelago.233 
In terms of operational capabilities, the acquisitions outlined here appear to match 
attempts to build up against China, however, they were executed before key Chinese 
moves in the SCS, suggesting that they were not caused by efforts to balance against 
China. Indeed, the big wave of arms procurement in Indonesia started in 2008, before 
Beijing’s formal submission of the “nine-dashed lines” in 2009. Even though Jakarta was 
aware of China’s claim of the extensive areas since 1994, the “nine-dashed lines” were 
never formally promulgated and the issue was effectively put on the backburner for some 
years. Furthermore, initial negotiations for the purchases of 2008 would have started 
some years before that, making them less likely to be driven by specific concerns about 
China. While Indonesia could have observed the rise of Sino-Vietnamese tensions that 
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began in 2007 and decided to arm up pre-emptively,234 such concerns—if any—did not 
manifest in other supporting diplomatic actions like those after the 2009 submission. 
Finally, with the “nine-dashed lines” made official, there was no incentive to slow down 
the arms build-up that was already in motion. As such, key maritime capabilities were 
procured in 2012–2013 with five vessels, three submarines and an additional MPA. This 
view is echoed by Gindarsah, who contends that Indonesia has since had to “recalibrate 
‘low-intensity balancing’ measures” that include seeking to improve “military logistical 
capabilities” and “early warning systems”—but such efforts have yet to materialize.235 
To summarize, Indonesia does not consider China as a security concern that 
because the threat that China might seek to “destabilize Indonesia [is] long gone.”236 
Still, Beijing’s protracted “nine-dashed lines” claim forces Jakarta to take preventive 
military measures in terms of beefing up deployments on the Natunas, and sustaining 
arms procurement efforts that had been in progress, with the augmentation of maritime 
capabilities in 2012–2013 being a key effort. Hence, as far as balancing against external 
threats are concerned, Indonesia’s arms procurements are more driven by extra-regional 
threats with respect to the SCS, rather than intra-regional concerns.  
E. FORCE MODERNIZATION 
Force Modernization is an often-cited reason to explain the impressive quantum 
of arms procurement as depicted in Figure 5, suggesting that it has at least been a 
moderate driver for arms procurement in Indonesia. On the one hand, it is a strong factor 
given the evidence of the need for modernization and the rhetoric of TNI commanders. 
Yet, on the other hand, the strength of force modernization as a driving factor is 
moderated by the fact that there are usually other motivating factors in place and that 
some of the procurements do not seem intended to produce modernizing outcomes—
undermining the strength of the force modernization factor.  
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The need for force modernization of the TNI was most prominently laid bare by 
the Tsunami of 2004, which publicly “exposed” the “outdated, ill-equipped, and 
demoralized” state of the TNI, but there were also other signs revealing the need to 
modernize the TNI for the purposes of obsolescence-prevention and maintaining 
operational readiness.237 On fleet obsolescence, less than half of the 213-ship TNI-AL 
fleet was “deemed seaworthy” due to their age.238 Similarly, a 2014 study highlighted 
that more than 50 percent of the TNI-AU’s aircraft had been in service for more than 20 
years.239 Meanwhile, on operational readiness, the “average readiness of TNI’s 
armaments [were] measured” to be “approximately 30–80 percent” in 2007, with much of 
the equipment “not regularly maintained and… lack[ing] operational readiness and 
reliability.”240 In all, these indicators paint a picture of a TNI justifiably in need of arms 
procurement if just for the sake of maintaining an operational fleet.  
This long-established need to procure arms to equip the TNI was the basis for the 
cost-prudent Minimum Essential Force (MEF)—a target that President Yudhoyono 
launched in 2005—to be achieved by 2024. The MEF aims to provide “a force level that 
can guarantee the attainment of immediate strategic defense interests, with the 
procurement priority given to the improvement of minimum defense strength and/or the 
replacement of outdated main weapons systems/equipment.”241 The MEF is inherently 
prudent in nature, as its policy is such that “procurement priority (should be) given to the 
improvement of minimum defense strength and/or the replacement of outdated main 
weapons systems/equipment,” underscoring the premise that it was not fiscally realistic to 
equip the TNI to a 100 percent of what it was envisaged to accomplish.242 This prudence 
was manifested when most of the TNI-AU “procurements were either second-hand or 
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that of refurbished platforms,”243 exemplified by the 24 ex-USAF F-16s and the ex-
RAAF C-130s. This tact was adopted by the other services too, as can be seen by the 
purchase of surplus Leopard tanks from Germany, or the acquisition of three F2000 
corvettes originally intended for Brunei. 
A second point supporting force modernization as a strong driving factor is that 
TNI commanders have adopted the rhetoric of force modernization with enthusiasm, with 
just a few instances listed to illustrate the regularity of this justification. In 2011, General 
Budiman (later to be Army Chief of Staff in 2013) spoke of the need to “replace a 
significant number of helicopters that will be retired in the coming years.”244 In 2014, 
then TNI Commander General Moeldoko stated that the TNI had to “constantly 
modernize our weaponry and cannot persist in modifying old platforms,” labelling the 
weapon systems of the Marines as being “obsolete.”245 More recently, TNI-AL Vice-
Admiral Ade Supandi also announced the intent replace the existing minesweepers that 
were “nearing the end of their service lives,” without the existence of a current threat 
context.246  
While the empirical and rhetorical justifications have been prominent, it is 
asserted that force modernization cannot be a strong driving factor as other factors are 
often relevant, downplaying the pure modernization motivation. These reasons include 
the host of reasons identified earlier in this chapter, such as resource availability, 
domestic politics, and threat perceptions. To illustrate, although President Yudhoyono 
was credited for making “modernizing the Armed Forces a priority of his 
administration,”247 other analysts have suggested that he had simply adopted the 
“uncontroversial drive for…modernization in the form of greater budgetary allocations 
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[and] procurement,” as opposed to following through with more challenging and 
fundamental military reforms.248  
Finally, the strength of the force modernization factor is also diluted by the ad-hoc 
and sometimes incomplete manner of equipping. Sudden buys of Sukhois using barter 
trade, followed by building up F-16 and Sukhoi fleets in tandem, and buying Leopard 
tanks without fire control systems paint a picture of modernization with potentially 
crippling logistics costs and questionable operational value downstream.249 Certainly, not 
all force modernization projects in other militaries result in operational successes, but the 
lack of fundamental components like fire control systems raise serious doubts about the 
desired effects of such procurements. In all, force modernization is only a moderately 
strong driving factor for arms procurement by Indonesia as competing demands and 
priorities preclude force modernization from being a driving factor in its own right. 
F. SUMMARY 
The Indonesian arms procurement trend is characterized by a much higher 
quantum of acquisitions, with two temporal peaks of from 2002 to 2004 and from 2008 to 
2012. This chapter has discussed the causal factors for the arms build-up and shown that 
the factors of resource availability and domestic politics have had the greatest sway in 
terms of driving arms acquisitions in Indonesia. Similar to the analysis for Malaysia, 
whilst the causal relationship for resource availability is straightforward and linear, the 
complex nature of domestic politics means that the different facets of budget 
contestation, corruption, and prestige may act in opposing ways. For external threats, 
arms procurements have been affected more by extra-regional concerns with regard to the 
SCS, and not intra-regional concerns, reflecting the liberalist slant of Indonesian foreign 
policy, especially within ASEAN. Finally, force modernization is a moderately strong 
driving factor for arms procurement by Indonesia, where real needs to upkeep the arsenal 
are diluted by the interaction of other causal factors. 
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IV. SINGAPORE 
Moving to Singapore, the four hypotheses will be examined to analyze the 
relative strengths of the drivers for arms procurement in the years 2000–2015. To first set 
the context, a review of Singapore’s arms procurement record since the EAFC is 
presented, highlighting key combatants and capabilities that have been acquired.  
A. REVIEW OF ARMS PROCUREMENT 
Any study of Singapore’s arms procurement trend needs to consider the context of 
Singapore’s defense policy, which is “fundamentally based on the twin pillars of 
deterrence and diplomacy.”250 To this end, deterrence is provided through the build-up of 
the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), as part of a ‘Total Defense’ approach to overcoming 
Singapore’s inherent disadvantages of “size, location, and relatively small population.”251 
As such, the SAF’s procurement policy is premised on long-term and sustained 
investment—instead of unpredictable peaks and troughs—leading Singapore to 
consistently be the largest defense spender in Southeast Asia since 1995.252 An overall 
depiction of Singapore’s arms procurement activities is shown in Figure 8. 
Singapore has been able to acquire several key capabilities across the three 
services from 2000 to 2015, to build the SAF to be able to “deliver a swift and decisive 
victory” should deterrence fail.253 For the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF), its 
fighter fleet has been renewed with phased purchases of F-16s and F-15SGs, enhanced by 
the introduction of a new Airborne Early Warning (AEW) platform in the G-550 AEW. 
Meanwhile, the combat capabilities of the Army has been bolstered by the delivery of 
advanced High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), Leopard-2A4 MBTs and 
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ASTER-30 Surface to Air Missile systems. Finally, the Republic of Singapore Navy 
(RSN) has added four submarines to its fleet, together with six stealth frigates and eight 
new Littoral Mission Vessels (LMVs). Taken as a whole, these procurements are 
impressive as they seek to realize the goal of a “networked armed force…capable of full-
spectrum operations” with operationally effective force sizes as well.254 
Figure 8.  Singapore: Main Arms Procurements since 2000 
 
Adapted from “SIPRI Arms Trade Register,” Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, accessed May 16, 2015, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/
trade_register.php; Jane’s IHS Database, Jane’s IHS, accessed May 25, 2015, 
http://janes.ihs.com.  
Two observations characterize the SAF’s procurement pattern. First, Singapore 
has spread its arms acquisitions out evenly over the fifteen years. As shown in Figure 8, 
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there were between four to five key combatant purchases in each five-year block. This 
measured level of acquisitions is a manifestation of the objective of a consistent rate of 
investment in defense without peaks and troughs. Indeed, analysts have observed that 
Singapore has planned its arms acquisition activities in such a manner that is “designed to 
reassure its neighbors while developing strong deterrence.”255 Besides the overall rate of 
procurement, the SAF has also been disciplined in keeping to long-term planning cycles 
to achieve regular fleet renewal. This is illustrated by how fighter aircraft have been 
bought in tranches approximately every five years, just as the naval fleet has been 
supplemented with frigates and submarines at regular intervals. 
The second observation is that while there have not been surges of procurements 
across the SAF, Figure 8 shows that there appears to be periods of focused development 
for particular services. The first instance pertains to the build-up of the RSAF in the 
period from 2005 to 2010, where key capabilities like the F-15SG and G-550 AEW 
aircraft were procured, together with smaller purchases of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAV) and trainers. This shifted to a phase of focus on the land and maritime domains 
from 2008 to 2013, where the HIMARS and Leopard MBTs were procured, together with 
the orders for eight LMVs and two Type-218SG submarines. Such a procurement pattern 
provides the SAF an opportunity to allow some services to integrate new systems whilst 
other services provide stability. Still, if one took these instances of focused development 
out of the context of the longer term development, then there could be alarm at the 
significant investments on certain capabilities that are concentrated in short time frames. 
With this picture of the arms build-up of the SAF, the analysis shifts to consider each of 
the four causal hypotheses for factors driving the arms acquisitions. 
B. RESOURCE AVAILABILITY 
A study of Singapore’s economics provides justifications that resource 
availability was a moderately strong driving factor for SAF arms procurement. The 
analysis begins with an investigation of how military expenditure correlated with GDP 
growth before characterizing how defense has been prioritized in the government budget.  
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To appreciate the correlation of military expenditure with GDP growth, it is first 
highlighted that Singapore was less affected by the EAFC, with its GDP only suffering a 
15 percent decline from 1997 to 1998, as compared to the more calamitous drops 
elsewhere in the region. Established as a free-market economy built on efficient 
infrastructure, the government had adopted a “Developmental State” model where the 
economy was centrally directed to promote development.256 This “interventionist 
strategy was [also] used to manage Singapore” out of the EAFC, resulting in an average 
8.5 percent GDP growth since 1998, which was impressive given the already-high GDP 
that Singapore had achieved as one of the four ‘Asian Tiger’ economies.257 Such strong 
economic fundamentals were instrumental in funding the sustained build-up of the SAF, 
manifested in the correlation between GDP growth and military expenditure as shown in 
Figure 9. 
Still, if one compares the average growth of military spending by Singapore as 
compared to Malaysia and Indonesia, it would seem like Singapore has not increased it’s 
spending by as much. From 2000 to 2014, the average annual growth in military spending 
was 5.5 percent for Singapore, less than 8.2 percent for Malaysia, and 15.2 percent for 
Indonesia.258 In truth, the difference in the quantum of growth can be attributed to the 
deliberate effort of the Singapore government to keep the defense budget steady despite a 
dip in the GDP during the EAFC, as shown in the initial segment of Figure 9. This action 
precluded a sharp dip in defense spending in 1998 that Malaysia and Indonesia 
experienced, inflating their subsequent increments. Indeed, this effort is a “clear indicator 
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of the Singapore government’s commitment to a steady and long-term build-up of the 
armed forces,” despite times of challenging economic conditions.259  
Figure 9.  Singapore: GDP and Military Expenditure Post-EAFC 
 
Adapted from “World Bank Database,” World Bank, accessed May 27, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org and “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, accessed May 13, 2015, http://www.sipri.org/
research/armaments/milex/milex_database.  
Another observation that can be drawn from Figure 9 is that while both military 
expenditure and GDP has generally been on a positive growth trend, the rate of increase 
for military expenditure has slowed down relative to the growth of the economy since 
2009. Why has there been this slow-down in the rate of growth of defense spending? Has 
the level of government commitment changed? To this end, further conclusions can be 
drawn from a study of Figure 10, which considers how defense funds have been allocated 
as a share of the GDP and the government budget. 
                                                 
259 Tai Yong Tan, “Singapore: Civil-Military Fusion,” in Coercion and Governance: The Declining 
Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2001), 277. 
 72 
Figure 10.  Singapore: Military Expenditure as a Share of GDP and National 
Budget 
 
Adapted from “World Bank Database,” World Bank, accessed May 27, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org and “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, accessed May 13, 2015, http://www.sipri.org/
research/armaments/milex/milex_database.  
First, a study of military expenditure as a share of the GDP shows that Singapore 
has continued to allocate a substantial proportion of the state’s wealth into defense. This 
statistic is depicted in the steady red line that reflects the government’s consistent 
commitment to fund defense efforts. Although the trend shows an almost 40 percent 
decline from a peak of 5.4 percent in 1998 to 3.3 percent in 2012–2014, this is still about 
two to three times greater than the shares committed by Malaysia and Indonesia, who 
have typically spent between 1 to 2.5 percent of their GDP on defense. Indeed, while 
Singapore’s defense burden as a share of GDP still surpasses Malaysia and Indonesia, 
Singapore’s reduced growth of the defense budget is nonetheless noteworthy. This policy 
also means that a buffer has been created for the SAF, as Singapore’s DM Dr. Ng Eng 
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Hen states, “the Singapore government is prepared to spend up to 6 percent of [the] GDP 
on defense,” although this metric is not “one that drives the development of the SAF.”260 
Second, the orange graph depicting the share of the government budget allocated 
to defense shows a similar commitment to sustained defense spending with the share 
maintained within a band of 25 to 35 percent of the budget. Again, this level is 
significantly higher than anywhere else in the world, as even Israel and the United States 
only devote 15 to 20 percent of their government budgets to defense. Still, it is noted that 
the overall trend seems to be declining as this share dropped below 30 percent in 2006, 
and it has trended towards 25 percent in the years since. 
In all, Singapore’s defense economic trends reflect the nation-state’s policy of 
sustained investment in the military to maintain the SAF as a credible deterrent force, 
without resorting to dramatic budget increases and cuts, as DM Ng has committed to “not 
alter its policy of gradual increases to military spending.”261 At the same time, the fact 
that the defense share of the GDP and the government budget has been declining deserves 
further study. On the one hand, it appears that Singapore has eased up on defense 
expenditure whilst retaining the capacity to drive up defense spending in the event of 
contingencies. On the other hand, these changes might reflect a shift in priority towards 
greater social spending to deal with societal needs and political demands. Nevertheless, 
the importance of the resource availability factor for driving Singapore’s arms 
procurement trend cannot be dismissed given the close correlation in Figure 9, and the 
significant quantum of defense allocations depicted in Figure 10. 
C. DOMESTIC POLITICS 
For Singapore, the domestic politics factor is strong because of how the 
procurement process is centrally managed within the political system that strongly 
supports the SAF, whilst the alternative causal relationships dealing with corruption and 
prestige are practically non-existent. Hence, the domestic politics factor in Singapore is 
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less multifaceted reflecting how the inner workings of domestic politics vary 
substantially across borders in Southeast Asia. 
From the section on the availability of resources, it is clear that the monies that 
can be invested in defense in Singapore are substantial, yet it was noted that the defense 
share of GDP and budget had declined, as depicted in Figure 10. Does this imply that the 
government budget has steadily been allocated to other areas? This phenomena can be 
analyzed according to political will and civilian dominance to explain how the 
contestation of the budget is a relevant facet in the influence of domestic politics on arms 
procurement in Singapore. 
First, Singapore’s apparent riches might cause one to underestimate the challenge 
of devoting 25 to 35 percent of the budget to raising a military, but it is highlighted that 
determined political will is still critical. While the government has thus far spent lesser 
than its defense allocation cap of 6 percent of the GDP, there are calls to divert defense 
allocations to other public needs.262 The countervailing rebuttal to these calls can be 
viewed in two ways. On the one hand, the defense dollars can be viewed simply as 
“insurance premiums” for peace.263 On the other hand, another narrative suggests that 
Singapore’s continued success rests on the “quest to create economic, political, 
diplomatic, and strategic space internationally through the judicious use of all available 
means,” where the “fostering of apposite environmental conditions that favor Singapore” 
have defined the “raison d’être of the SAF.”264 In other words, the prospects of the SAF 
and Singapore are seen to be intertwined and even those who call for funds to be 
allocated to other demands indirectly support continued funding for the military, because 
all other aspects of development—be it education or healthcare—are only possible 
because of the economic strength that rides on the environment engendered by the SAF. 
This thinking has been another legacy of the late Lee Kuan Yew, who repeatedly stressed 
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the importance of the SAF to Singapore’s future.265 In 2012, Lee Kuan Yew was quoted 
saying, “From the day we started, I knew that we needed a strong SAF and I believe that 
still remains today. Without a strong SAF, there is no economic future, there is no 
security.”266 
Second, there is a high degree of civilian dominance in the decision-making 
process in Singapore’s military establishment. Indeed, Singapore’s arms procurement 
process is renowned for “ruthless cost-effectiveness,”267 and it is widely deemed to be 
“the most sophisticated and professional in Southeast Asia.”268 At first sight, one might 
attribute such a professional process to reflect deep military influence in the decision-
making process, but the truth is the exact opposite, as Singapore’s arms acquisition 
decisions are dominated by civilian authorities. In truth, the SAF and the Ministry of 
Defense (MINDEF) operates within a “fusion model,” where the military “functions as 
an integrated part of a centralized, bureaucratic state.”269 Hence, while the military is 
highly influential in providing professional military inputs that frame long term force 
modernization, there is “undisputed dominance of the civilian sector over the 
military.”270 As such, concerns about the political influence of militaries are not relevant 
in Singapore’s domestic political environment. 
The second facet of domestic politics is corruption, which is also not deemed to 
be an issue in Singapore, as Singapore’s Transparency International rankings attest to.271 
Corruption is constantly combated across MINDEF and the government, with senior 
officers routinely rotated so as to prevent the “entrenchment of power base(s)” that could 
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lay the ground for corruption.272 Indeed, various analysts concur that “there have been 
very few reports of corruption regarding Singapore’s procurement processes,”273 and 
“there has never been any suggestion of malpractice in relation to major defense 
procurement by Singapore, although there have occasionally been examples of junior 
contracting officers being convicted for corruption in relation to minor acquisitions from 
local contractors.”274 Looking beyond the motive of self-aggrandizement through 
corruption, Tan also dismisses the suggestion that the movement of retired officers to 
“key positions in civil service and the cabinet” could create “undue emphasis on 
defense,” as he contends that it is more a “manifestation of the close nexus…between the 
civil and military leadership of the country” than patronage-based political 
maneuvering.275   
Finally, while the factor of pursuing national prestige has been raised for other 
Southeast Asian states, there has not been any evidence of this being relevant for 
Singapore. For example, while Bilveer Singh highlighted that the pursuit of prestige as a 
relevant factor for Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, he was deliberate in excluding 
Singapore from that list.276 
Therefore, the factor of domestic politics is an important one that drives arms 
procurement for the SAF, but it only operates through the causal relationship of how 
government stake-holders divide the national budget, and the other two facets of 
corruption and prestige are not relevant. On the contestation of the budget, the SAF 
enjoys a privileged position where its contribution to securing the operating space for 
Singapore is viewed as being synonymous with the prospects of Singapore, and as such, 
it continues to receive resources to fund long-term procurement projects, with the 
flexibility of utilizing a 6 percent spending cap of the GDP should the need arise.  
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D. EXTERNAL THREATS 
Given Singapore’s accentuated vulnerabilities as a small city-state, have external 
threats driven arms procurement? Similar to Malaysia and Indonesia, external threats will 
be discussed along the lines of intra-regional threats before extra-regional threats. 
1. Intra-Regional Threats 
Due to the fractious history amongst these three neighbors in Southeast Asia, 
Singapore’s large defense spending appears, on the surface, to be influenced by intra-
regional threats; however, this section argues that Singapore’s arms procurements have 
been driven more by a chronic sense of vulnerability rather than by threats from Malaysia 
or Indonesia. This section first discusses the Singaporean conception of vulnerability, 
before exploring the strategy of deterrence, to show that Singapore’s arms procurement 
efforts since the EAFC are not a response to intra-regional threats.  
As recently as 2012, PM Lee Hsien Loong remarked that “we [Singapore] would 
always be vulnerable to the vagaries of external events,” reflecting how the perception of 
vulnerability persists in the top echelon of Singapore’s leadership.277 In the same vein, 
Sullivan writes that the “classical understanding of Singapore’s strategic position…is one 
of vulnerability,” stressing the challenge associated with Singapore’s small size.278 
Indeed, size is a cornerstone of Singapore’s perspective of vulnerability, as the small 
geographical land mass of Singapore also means a lack of strategic depth. Translating this 
vulnerability to military arms procurement, Chang highlights that this “lack of depth” led 
Singapore’s defense planners to “enlarge the island’s defensive depth by expanding the 
operational reach of [the SAF’s] combat elements.”279 Hence, the arms build-up of the 
SAF, especially from the 1970s to 1980s, was premised on the principle of creating a 
military force able to conduct a “pre-emptive, first strike doctrine similar to that of 
Israel.”280 While such a doctrine was offensive in nature, it reflected the logic that 
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Singapore’s security calculus was based on its inherent weaknesses, and not by the 
threats of other states. Since the EAFC, although the disadvantages associated with 
physical size have been partially mitigated by the power projection potential of the SAF, 
the conception of vulnerability remained relevant; as PM Lee added, “We must always 
fend for ourselves… in a rapidly changing world, this is one fact that will not change for 
Singapore.”281  
Still, although Singapore’s arms procurement appears to be driven more by 
inherent vulnerabilities independently of external threats, it would be remiss not to 
examine the influence of Singapore’s fractious bilateral relationships with Malaysia and 
Indonesia.282 Malaysia, in particular, has been described as “the most conspicuous factor 
in Singapore’s security calculations,” where their bilateral relations are the “most 
tempestuous and unpredictable amongst all countries in the region.”283 When considering 
bilateral issues that have cropped up since the EAFC, the two most contentious ones have 
been the territorial dispute pertaining to Pedra Branca and the supply of water. First, 
“Kuala Lumpur accused Singapore of blocking its fishing vessels from the seas around 
[Pedra Branca]” in 2002, escalating bilateral tensions that had already been building up 
since 1997 for a host of other reasons.284 Second, although the supply of water from 
Malaysia to Singapore was enshrined in the separation documents, arguments over the 
pricing of water between the two nations in 2002 led some Malaysian politicians to 
recklessly introduce “the notion of war” into their rhetoric.285 Meanwhile, although 
issues with Indonesia were less contentious, they persisted for a long time, like failed 
attempts by “Jakarta to extradite ethnic Chinese suspects…domiciled in Singapore” and 
the controversy arising from the export of sand to Singapore.286 More recently, relations 
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dipped momentarily in 2014 when the TNI-AL decided to name a new F2000 corvette as 
KRI Usman Harun, after two Indonesian marines who had been executed for the 1965 
MacDonald House bombing in Singapore during the Indonesian Confrontation.287 
Did these dips in bilateral relations drive arms acquisition by Singapore? 
Recalling the review of arms procurements, the defining characteristic of Singapore’s 
arms procurement trend since the EAFC has been a steady rate of military expenditure 
with no spikes in arms procurement. New weapon systems were bought in regular 
intervals, and spaced out to cater to budgetary consistency and allow for force integration 
within the SAF. Indeed, a review of Figures 9 and 10 would underscore the uninteresting 
trend of Singapore’s military expenditure since the EAFC. Therefore, there is no 
evidence that intra-regional threats or disputes have driven Singapore’s arms acquisitions. 
Indeed, the bilateral arguments raised above were symptomatic of close neighbors joined 
together in history and mutual rivalry, and analysts have surmised that Singapore in fact 
faces “no credible external security threats from neighboring states.”288 
Hence, Singapore’s arms procurement efforts with respect to the intra-regional 
context are thus better explained by the adoption of a strategy of deterrence, as a more 
sustainable answer to chronic vulnerability. Within Singapore, the SAF has been 
developed as a “conventional deterrent that would dissuade any adversary from mounting 
a direct attack,” as part of a larger national effort of Total Defense.289 Externally, 
deterrence is paired with diplomacy as Singapore’s “proactive foreign policy” is geared 
to “enlarge its strategic space and ensure a positive local and regional environment.”290 
Within the region, this includes bilateral defense diplomacy efforts, as well as active 
participation in ASEAN-led forums like the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting—Plus 
(ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Meanwhile, Singapore’s efforts 
to leverage diplomatic means are manifested by the fact that they have sought to resolve 
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all their bilateral territorial disputes through negotiations or with the International Court 
of Justice.291 Finally, even in the conduct of arms procurement, observers note that 
Singapore has been “cautious with regard to acquiring new military capabilities given its 
commitment to maintaining stability in Southeast Asia,” reflecting an acknowledgement 
that deterrence involves messaging and the deterrent effect of new systems can quickly 
be eroded if it only incites the rival to react with other acquisitions of their own.292  
Therefore, the factor of intra-regional threats does not drive arms procurement for 
the SAF. This appears surprising, as Singapore’s realist mentality, evidenced by its 
“hardnosed security outlook [and] self-help philosophy,” makes Singapore appear closest 
to being driven by intra-regional threat considerations.293 Nevertheless, the analysis 
highlights how the chronic sense of vulnerability drives the strategy of deterrence, 
leading to a measured pace of acquisition to build up the SAF. When combined with 
diplomacy, Singapore is thus able to “deal confidently with neighbors Indonesia and 
Malaysia, despite periodic tensions.”294  
2. Extra-Regional Threats 
Beyond the immediate region, this section assesses that the rise of China has not 
been a driving factor for arms procurement in Singapore, stemming from the analysis that 
China does not represent a “direct security threat to Singapore.”295 To this end, this 
assessment has been developed by examining the issue from two perspectives: Sino-
Singapore relations and Singapore’s response to the SCS dispute. 
First, Singapore’s relations with China are less ambivalent, because although 
Singapore employs similar hedging strategies, its “small size, geostrategic vulnerability, 
and continuing concerns about long term Chinese intentions propel it toward a close, 
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strategic partnership with the U.S.”296 At the same time, Singapore will continue to stay 
closely associated with China to benefit from economic ties, even though there are pros 
and cons in doing so. On a positive note, China’s open-door policies provided economic 
opportunities for Singapore to develop a “‘second wing’” of its economy.297 Singapore 
was not interested just in bilateral trade, but in the potential of a “complex Asian 
production network” that created “intraregional trade.”298 On the other hand, China’s rise 
also meant greater competition for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), with China 
estimated to be “siphoning” 50 to 70 percent of Asia’s FDI, leaving just 20 percent for 
ASEAN.299 Aside from such competitive outcomes, China was still widely perceived to 
be Asia’s economic engine, and Singapore remains keen to be closely integrated with 
China to benefit from that rise. 
A second and unique aspect of Singapore’s relationship with China arises from 
the predominantly Chinese demographic of Singapore, where ethnic-Chinese make up 
74.3 percent of the population.300 From Singapore’s perspective, the nation-state is 
“uneasy about being seen as the ‘third China,’” in light of its “Muslim-majority 
neighbors.”301 This was manifested by how Singapore insisted on being one of the last 
Southeast Asia countries to normalize ties with China—only after Malaysia and 
Indonesia had done so. Conversely, China has sometimes been disappointed by the lack 
of “Chinese-affinity,” like when Singapore supported Japan’s bid for a permanent seat at 
the United Nations Security Council.302 Singapore thus identifies with being more 
Southeast Asian than Chinese, but this distinction is not always appreciated by Beijing. 
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Second, as a non-claimant in the SCS dispute, Singapore’s concerns are for a 
peaceful resolution of the dispute and that freedom of navigation remains unaffected.303 
These concerns reflect Singapore’s desire that a “regional status-quo” is maintained to 
facilitate continued economic growth, and that the SCS dispute should not be allowed to 
negatively impact trade routes.304 With the rise of tensions in the SCS since 2007, 
Singapore has made diplomatic efforts to urge “China to clarify its claim in the SCS,” but 
these have not met any success.305 Indeed, over the past two years, Singapore has 
watched with concern as the increasingly aggressive actions of China and the response of 
the U.S., Vietnam and the Philippines, seem to feed off each other; leading PM Lee to 
call on the countries to “break the vicious cycle and not let disputes sour the broader 
relationship” at the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore in 2015.306 
Besides these diplomatic initiatives, the SAF has moved to anchor the U.S.’s 
presence in the area by continued engagement with the U.S. military. This strategy is 
rooted in the perception that the U.S. is “the key to a stable power balance in Asia,” 
leading Singapore to “publicly advocate a regional power balance as [being] desirable, 
with the tacit acceptance of the notion of a hierarchy of power…with the U.S. at the 
apex.”307 As such, the SAF has gone to great lengths to expand Changi Naval Base, at 
the eastern tip of Singapore, to accommodate U.S. Navy aircraft carriers.308 More 
recently, one of the newest combat U.S. combat vessel—the Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS)—began an 18 month deployment in Singapore, with plans for up to four LCS 
vessels operating from Singapore on a rotational basis from 2018.309  
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Finally, from the procurement perspective, the SAF has maintained an arsenal of 
predominantly modern, Western-sourced armaments that facilitates frequent exchanges 
and exercises with the U.S. military. Through such close cooperation, combined with the 
hosting of “the USN Logistics Group West Pacific and the USAF 497th Combat Training 
Squadron,” as well as Changi Naval Bases’ aircraft carrier berth all work to anchor 
continued U.S. military presence in the region.310  In essence, this routine and prominent 
U.S. military presence represents the desired outcome of Singapore’s actions. 
Therefore, while Singapore works to shape its extra-regional space to ensure 
stability as far as possible, its focus in terms of arms procurement with respect to external 
threats is weighted to the intra-regional realm. Within that intra-regional realm, there are 
no specific threats that drive arms procurement, and Singapore has instead adopted a 
strategy of deterrence and diplomacy to address its chronic vulnerability, by steadily 
investing in the build-up of the SAF. 
E. FORCE MODERNIZATION 
Force modernization is a key driver for the arms build-up of the SAF, as a result 
of the strategy of deterrence, as well as the need to mitigate the inherent demographical 
challenges of the nation-state. This section will discuss the rationale for the sustained 
force modernization effort, before identifying evidence for how the force modernization 
initiatives have led to arms acquisition for the SAF. 
Two main reasons underpin the SAF’s drive to undertake a sustained effort of 
force modernization. First, Singapore’s adoption of “Total Defense” is based on the 
“belief that the disadvantages inherent in Singapore’s geographical size, location and 
relatively small population can be countered through gaining human and technological 
advantages” in all fields.311 Indeed, technology is a sensible strategy for a small country 
with a limited but well-educated population, where acquisitions aim for more firepower 
and fewer personnel to operate.312 Through technology and training, it is desired that the 
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SAF can exploit the “principle of force multiplication,” such that “each man will count 
for several in fighting power.”313 
Second, modernization forms a cornerstone of Singapore’s defense policy, which 
is underpinned by deterrence and diplomacy. Deterrence requires potential adversaries to 
be convinced that one has a superior military capability—encompassing weapons 
technology, training, as well as the resilience to engage in war. While the SAF remains 
untested in actual conflict—perhaps a vindication of its strategy of deterrence—they have 
invested heavily in both arms acquisition and training to become “among the best trained 
and technologically capable in Asia.”314 Taken to higher level of abstraction, the SAF’s 
modernization drive goes beyond plain operational considerations, as the quality of the 
SAF is “an imperative for the country’s economic survival,” such that investors remain 
confident of Singapore’s continued stability.315 
With the rationale for force modernization spelt out, what is the evidence that it 
has driven arms procurement in Singapore? On the one hand, one can point to the many 
instances where the SAF has been the first to attain certain technological advantages 
compared to other militaries in the region. These include the first Air Independent 
Propulsion equipped submarines in the Type 218SGs, the first AEW aircraft in the E-2Cs 
that have been retired and replaced by new G550s, and the first land attack helicopters in 
the AH-64Ds. The SAF is also the only military in Southeast Asia to possess longer-
range UAVs like the Heron-1 and Deep Sea Rescue submersibles. Finally, Singapore is 
also the “only Southeast Asian partner in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program,” 
underscoring Singapore’s commitment to ensure that the SAF keeps pace with the latest 
military technologies.316 Beyond hardware, the SAF has also sought to modernize 
through a transformation of how the SAF is organized and fights, resulting in the “Third 
Generation SAF,” a vision of “a network-enabled force joining sophisticated intelligence, 
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surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities with advanced strike capabilities 
seamlessly across ground, air and naval forces.”317 
On the other hand, the impact of force modernization on arms procurement is that 
it also affects the manner in which the SAF acquires systems. In the words of Singapore’s 
Chief Defense Scientist, “we [Singapore] have to be smart buyers of weapons systems,” 
highlighting that while force modernization is a strong driving factor for arms 
procurement, it also influences how the SAF chooses its weapons systems. In this case, 
being a ‘smart buyer’ does not just entail buying the most expensive and most modern 
equipment, as besides the need to invest the defense budget in systems that would yield 
the best combat outcomes and deterrence effects, the SAF has been cognizant that such 
military technologies are “not magic bullets.”318 
In all, while the SAF will need to be critical in how it chooses to modernize to 
meet its security challenges, it is clear that force modernization has been a strong driver 
of arms procurement for the SAF. This logic is underpinned by the inherent demographic 
realities of Singapore, as well as its stated defense policy. 
F. SUMMARY 
From 2000 to 2015, the procurement pattern for the SAF has been evenly spread 
out, with significant acquisitions made approximately every five years, reflecting the 
long-term view that has built the SAF to be one of the best equipped in the region. There 
are multiple drivers at work that have influenced the arms procurement patterns that have 
resulted in the coherent pattern of acquisitions. The availability of resource is important 
given the correlation between the growth of government resources and military 
expenditure, providing for long term forecasts and force-structuring. More important, 
though, is the causal relationship of how government stake-holders allocate the national 
budget, and the domestic political commitment to sustaining the generous 6 percent GDP 
cap for military spending. In contrast, threats are not deemed to be a driving factor as 
Singapore’s strategy of deterrence has been designed to address chronic vulnerability, 
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instead of specific threats. Finally, the strategy of deterrence is realized by a deliberate 
effort at shrewd force modernization to build a technologically-enhanced SAF that 
mitigates the challenges associated with a small population and a tiny land mass. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of how the four causal factors influenced the procurement of arms by 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore reveals that they functioned differently in each 
country, reflecting the diversity amongst countries so closely intertwined by geography 
and history. This chapter will first summarize the findings regarding the underlying 
drivers of arms procurement to answer the research question and evaluate the four 
hypotheses. Second, this chapter will characterize the arms procurement trends in 
Southeast Asia in terms of Buzan and Herring’s arms dynamic model, before concluding 
with an assessment of the regional security implications of such a dynamic.  
A. ADDRESSING THE HYPOTHESES AND THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Based on the evidence and analysis presented in the preceding chapters, it is clear 
that the arms procurement efforts in all three countries are driven by unique sets of 
underlying factors that reflect their unique combination of domestic politics and 
international challenges. While four main variables provided a framework for analysis 
and comparison, it was also clear that how these factors operated within the countries was 
equally diverse. This section will thus summarize the findings for each variable in turn 
and assess their respective hypotheses. 
1. Resource Availability  
All three countries experienced strong economic growth since the end of the 
EAFC, generating the financial muscle that allowed them to spend on defense. The 
availability of funds translated to increased military spending as evidenced by the 
correlation between GDP growth and military expenditure—depicted in Figures 3, 6, and 
9. Still, the research revealed the varying strength of this factor in driving arms 
procurement across the countries. For instance, the resource availability factor was 
especially strong for Indonesia, as its military expenditures grew strongly alongside 
robust economic growth and tapered off in times of economic slow-downs like the EAFC 
and more recently since 2008. Meanwhile, Malaysia’s military expenditure trend 
correlated closely with GDP trends until 2012, when defense spending practically 
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stagnated even though the economy still managed 4.4 percent growth annually. In 
contrast, Singapore appears to be an anomaly, because apart from long-term correlation 
between GDP growth and military expenditure, Singapore’s defense spending did not dip 
after the EAFC, and it has instead slowed down in recent years even though its economy 
has not suffered greatly since 2009. 
As such, to understand the resource availability factor closer, there was a need to 
go beyond simple correlation between GDP and military expenditure, to study the trends 
of how the governments allocated funds to defense, as a share of GDP and the budget. 
Malaysia’s defense spending as a share of GDP has declined steadily since the EAFC, 
resulting in its lowest level of 1.49 percent in 2014. This decline has corresponded with a 
45 percent drop in the defense share of the government budget from its peak in 2003–
2005, to 2013. Similarly, Singapore also exhibited a slow decline in the defense share of 
the GDP from 5.4 to 3.3 percent from 1998 to 2014. In addition, the defense share of the 
government budget dipped 16.7 percent over the same time period. Still, as much as the 
trends for Malaysia and Singapore look alike, there are important differences. First, when 
considering defense spending as a share of GDP, Singapore has maintained its 
commitment to a 6 percent of GDP spending cap that remains available should 
contingencies arise. By contrast, the Malaysian government has not set such a target. 
Second, in terms of defense spending as a share of the government budget, Malaysia’s 
allocation has decreased from 13 percent to 7 percent whilst Singapore’s allocation has 
fluctuated in the 25 to 35 percent range—reflecting two very different levels of defense 
commitments. Meanwhile, Indonesia presents a different pattern of defense spending. 
Since the end of the EAFC, the defense spending has amounted to less than 1 percent of 
the GDP and has never exceeded 5 percent of the entire government budget. Finally, 
Indonesia is also unique with respect to its practice of self-funding and external loans, 
both of which the government has tried to stamp out. 
In all, hypothesis one is strongly supported by empirical evidence that illustrates 
how the availability of resources is a strong driving factor for arms procurement in the 
three countries studied. Indeed, if the region failed to recover from the EAFC, none of the 
arms procurement trends observed could have occurred in the same manner. 
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2. Domestic Politics  
The study of resource availability required the analysis of how the governments 
allocated monies for defense, highlighting the role of domestic politics in defining how 
the resources of the countries were allocated. Quite clearly, domestic politics was a 
complex factor because how it manifested in relation to the defense procurement process 
varied significantly across the three countries. Domestic politics was also multifaceted, as 
illustrated by the three themes of political contestation for budget allocation, corruption, 
and the desire for regional prestige, given the relevance of these factors in Southeast 
Asia.  
For Singapore, although only budget contestation was relevant, it was highly 
influential in maintaining the focused priority for defense through a generous 6 percent 
GDP cap. This high spending cap reflects the continued political will to ensure that the 
SAF remains capable enough to ensure Singapore’s strategic space in the region, built 
upon a fused civilian-military complex that planned long-term military procurements 
with the assurance of political support. Meanwhile, for Malaysia, although the civilian 
establishment similarly dominates the MAF, there is greater obfuscation of the 
procurement process due to the prevalence of corruption. Corruption persists due to 
middlemen seeking kickbacks, inflating the prices of armaments, and possibly crowding 
out other types of procurements. Even though the desire for national prestige encouraged 
procurement of particular types of sophisticated hardware like submarines, political 
contestation from other national needs has also reduced the level of military expenditure 
in the past few years. Finally, declining public support for the ruling coalition, or Barisan 
Nasional, reduces the government’s room for maneuver and makes it careful to select 
politically advantageous procurements. 
Domestic politics plays a large role in affecting arms procurement in Indonesia as 
it regards itself to be best-positioned to lead Southeast Asia and the retention of political 
influence by the TNI. Political contestation over government funds has been shown to be 
especially strong in Indonesia, exemplified by the contest between the TNI and the 
POLRI, as well as other social demands. Corruption is prevalent too, substantiated by 
Transparency International’s assessment, and the evidence of recent procurements that 
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are still tainted with allegations of irregularities. Finally, the desire for national prestige is 
also accentuated in Indonesia’s case because of its inherent size and ambitions to be a 
regional leader. Thus, the maintenance of territorial integrity and the lure of symbolic 
acquisitions also drive arms procurement efforts. 
In all, hypothesis two has been supported by relatively strong evidence, such that 
domestic politics can be considered to be a strong driving factor in Southeast Asia, even 
though it works in varied ways across the three countries. It is argued that the domestic 
politics variable has the strongest effects in Indonesia and Singapore, and weakest in 
Malaysia. In particular, domestic politics is clearly instrumental in determining how 
available resources are directed towards arms acquisition efforts. 
3. External Threats 
The need to defend against external threats is perhaps the most commonly 
accepted rationale for arms procurement by states, but this research has demonstrated that 
such external threats have not been a strong driver of arms procurement in these three 
countries. Among the three nations, it is Singapore that comes closest to be considered as 
conducting arms procurement in response to external threats. However, the distinction to 
note here is that while Singapore has built up its military for the purpose of deterring 
potential aggressors—including its neighbors—this strategy of deterrence is rooted in a 
chronic sense of vulnerability, and not the perception of specific external threats. Hence, 
as much as Singapore has invested heavily in the SAF to build strategic space for its 
leaders, the driving logic has been one of vulnerability, originating from its inherent lack 
of strategic depth. Beyond the immediate neighborhood, China does not feature 
prominently in Singapore’s defense calculus insofar as Singapore finds it more effective 
to use diplomacy and defense relations to shape its extra-regional environment to be 
stable, secure, and conducive for economic growth. 
In contrast to tiny Singapore, Indonesia’s perspective about external threats 
differs substantially. First, Indonesia’s threat perception is weighted towards extra-
regional threats originating from China and the related SCS dispute, and it is with respect 
to extra-regional threats that arms procurements have been initiated. Indonesia’s foremost 
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concern remains the implications of China’s “nine-dashed lines” claim with respect to the 
EEZ and the gas fields off the Natunas. This concern has resulted in steps being taken to 
strengthen the TNI presence on the Natunas and sustained support for the procurement of 
naval capabilities in 2012 to 2013. Second, although Indonesia is involved in intra-
regional disputes and periods of tension, the evidence has not suggested any causal link 
to arms procurement. Finally, Malaysia’s threat perception is similar to that of Indonesia 
as both countries view extra-regional threats to be more significant than intra-regional 
threats. This may seem unsurprising as Malaysia is the only SCS dispute claimant 
amongst the countries studied, but the reality is that Malaysia has only recently begun to 
shift away from its accommodative tone towards Beijing, exemplified by Chief of MAF 
General Zulkifeli bin Mohd Zin’s public comment about China’s “unwarranted 
provocation [in] the SCS.”319 Besides more aggressive diplomacy and military 
deployments, Malaysia has yet to embark on arms procurement measures, but this could 
well change if Beijing does not change its tack. Meanwhile, intra-regional security 
concerns that have centered on territorial disputes have not driven arms acquisitions by 
Kuala Lumpur. 
Therefore, this thesis has found very little evidence to support hypothesis three. In 
short, external threats have not been a strong driver for arms procurement in Southeast 
Asia, as it is only in limited situations where threats have been shown to drive arms 
acquisitions. Furthermore, it is highlighted that the limited situations where external 
threats might be relevant to arms procurement have been with respect to extra-regional 
threats from China. This situation also reflects the relatively benign security environment 
that is enjoyed by countries in Southeast Asia, founded upon a stable balance of power 
and healthy economic growth. 
4. Force Modernization 
If building against external threats were considered to be the most conventionally 
accepted rationale for arms procurement, then force modernization would be the next 
                                                 




most likely reason. This research, however, again draws a counter-intuitive conclusion 
where force modernization is only a moderate driving factor for arms acquisition across 
Southeast Asia. To a certain extent, this finding is shaped by the definition of force 
modernization adopted in this thesis, which focuses on situations where states seek to 
modernize purely for obsolescence management or for adopting a new capability, without 
being conflated with wider security threats.  
Based on this strict definition, while Malaysia and Indonesia have been observed 
to acquire arms to replace obsolete equipment, this factor is still not considered to be very 
strong. For Malaysia, although there were instances where platforms were purchased to 
successfully replace older systems, the MiG-29 replacement was highlighted as a case 
where the drive to replace obsolete systems did not always result in arms procurement 
efforts. As for Indonesia, there exists a strong groundswell of support for procuring 
newer platforms to replace old ones, and there have been prudent efforts to address these 
concerns through the MEF plan. However, the strength of force modernization as a 
driving factor for Indonesian arms procurement is diluted by the undeniable presence of 
other factors like domestic politics and threat perceptions, as well as instances where ad-
hoc procurements resulted in incomplete systems without critical combat components. 
Indeed, in such instances, the natural question is then what were the real underlying 
reasons that these systems were bought? 
Singapore thus takes the role of an outlier in this instance, as force modernization 
is driven less by a desire to replace obsolete equipment than to acquire newer capabilities. 
Force modernization is a critical aspect of its deterrence strategy, which requires 
strenuous efforts to chase the state-of-the-art in terms of military technology, so as to 
overcome inherent demographic challenges. Indeed, there are numerous examples of the 
SAF attaining modern capabilities—often the first in the region—and its unique 
participation in the JSF program underscores the commitment to maintain a modern SAF.  
As such, the only evidence to support hypothesis four arises from the study of 
Singapore’s force modernization only. On the whole, therefore, force modernization is 
assessed to be only a moderate driving factor for arms procurement in Southeast Asia. 
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5. Addressing the Research Question 
In response to the question of what are the underlying reasons driving arms 
procurement in Southeast Asian countries, this research has come to the conclusion that 
the combination of resource availability and domestic politics provided the best causal 
explanation for the arms acquisition activities. Meanwhile, force modernization is a 
moderate factor that varies in importance from country to country. In making this 
conclusion, two further relevant observations are raised.  
First, there is a preponderance of domestic factors as drivers of arms procurement 
in Southeast Asia. Instead of external drivers like intra-regional or extra-regional threats 
pushing the ASEAN states to acquire weapons, the evidence has pointed towards 
domestic factors like resource availability and domestic politics as the main drivers. Even 
for Singapore, the strength of the force modernization factor is founded upon domestic 
challenges such as the demographics of a small population and the geography of limited 
defensive depth. Second, the research is also in agreement with other analysts who 
stressed that the reasons for arms procurement in Southeast Asia are multifaceted and 
complex. Indeed, even amongst three countries that are so closely tied in history and 
geography, there is remarkable variance in how the factors present themselves in each 
case. 
B. ARMS DYNAMIC CHARACTERIZATION 
With a consolidated assessment of the underlying drivers of arms procurement 
since the EAFC, it becomes clear that there is no arms race amongst Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and Singapore. Besides the relevant points raised by scholars regarding the lack of 
intensity and lack of single-minded antagonistic relations, the research has shown that the 
drivers of arms procurement in these three countries have been predominantly based on 
domestic factors of resource availability and domestic politics. In other words, countries 
bought arms when they had enough in their coffers and when their political leadership 
decided to do so. With such a causal mechanism directing the acquisition of arms, it is 
inherently not possible for an arms race to occur as the causal pathway does not hinge on 
external stimuli. This is distinct from the classic arms race between the British and 
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German navies prior to World War I, where both parties were intentionally improving 
their military capabilities in direct and reciprocal competition with each other. The 
centrality of domestic drivers for arms procurement in the three countries underscores 
how the findings of this thesis cannot easily be extrapolated to the rest of Southeast Asia. 
For the larger region, more detailed studies of the domestic and external drivers for each 
country would be needed to make broader assessments about the arms dynamic in 
Southeast Asia. 
With the lack of evidence for the existence of an arms race amongst the three 
countries, is the increased military spending in the region best characterized as the 
“maintenance of the military status quo,” or an “arms competition?”320 A quick recall of 
Chapter I defines “maintenance” as efforts that simply preserve the current balance of 
power, whereas the “arms competition” denotes cases where potential adversaries “chip 
away at the status quo and constantly seek to improve their position, although having no 
confidence in gaining a decisive advantage.”321 It is thus submitted that the arms 
dynamic amongst the three countries is better described to be in a situation of 
“maintenance,” with occasional prestige-driven excursions to “arms competition.” This 
assessment is depicted in Figure 11, and it can be explained through two main points.  
Figure 11.  Characterization of Southeast Asian Arms Dynamic. 
Adapted from Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 79–81. 
First, although all the countries have acquired more sophisticated arms that would 
improve their military capabilities, these improvements have been focused more at 
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progressing from their current military technology level than “chip[ping] away at the 
status quo.”322 To this end, the weakness of evidence for the external threat hypothesis 
reveals the absence of an obsession in these three countries with the military capabilities 
of their neighbors. In addition, the evidence that arms acquisitions have been driven by 
force modernization suggests that those acquisitions have been focused on obsolescence 
management, especially in Malaysia and Indonesia. Perhaps it is only Singapore’s focus 
on force modernization for deterrence that suggests an emphasis on extending its military 
capability edge within the region; but even then, Singapore’s 40 percent fall in military 
expenditure as a share of GDP since 1998 reveals that Singapore is not bent on a limitless 
expansion of its military lead. Indeed, this phenomenon accords with Buzan and 
Herring’s judgment that “if military expenditure is a constant or declining percentage of 
GNP, then one is probably observing maintenance.”323 Still, it is also naïve to imagine 
that the MAF, TNI, and the SAF do not use regional military capability levels as their 
benchmarks for deciding on the types of armaments to request, but the research has been 
quite clear that procuring arms to tip the regional balance in one’s favor has not been a 
driving motivation to embark on arms procurement. If that had been the primary 
motivation, then one would find the countries being driven towards a more aggressive 
arms dynamic. 
Second, the arms dynamic has made excursions towards being an “arms 
competition” because of the desire for national prestige. Here, the regional rivalry 
expressed through the acquisition of sophisticated systems such as submarines, advanced 
fighter jets, and MBTs shows that the regional arms dynamic is not simply a plain form 
of maintenance. Still, this sub-factor, as discussed in the country-focused chapters, varies 
in strength across the countries and only in specific instances has been strong enough to 
shift the dynamic towards “arms competition.” 
In contrast to this conclusion, Bitzinger actually considered the situation in 
Southeast Asia to be a case of ‘arms competition’ as the regional militaries have “added 
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many capabilities that they did not possess earlier,” but he also conceded that the 
“numbers being procured do not seem to be in numbers large enough to seriously affect 
the regional balance of power,” with the possible exception of Singapore.324 Indeed, 
therein lies the conundrum at the heart of understanding the arms procurement trends in 
Southeast Asia. On the one hand, domestic factors have dominated the causal path 
responsible for directing and controlling the arms procurement activities, resulting in a 
cost-prudent and sustainable approach across the countries that more closely resembles 
“maintenance.” On the other hand, the high-profile acquisitions and the occasional 
prestige-driven procurements tend to paint a picture of “arms competition” that are not 
groundless themselves. It is therefore on this note that this thesis concludes that the most 
appropriate characterization of the arms dynamic in Southeast Asia is one of 
“maintenance,” with the occasional prestige-drive excursions toward an “arms 
competition.”  
C. REGIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 
Building upon a better understanding of the underlying drivers of arms 
procurement and the arms dynamic present among the three countries in Southeast Asia, 
two regional security implications are identified. On the one hand, the existing arms 
dynamic supports optimism for continued security in the region. On the other hand, an 
increased frequency of excursions towards an “arms competition” dynamic could be 
cause for concern. 
1. Optimism for Continued Regional Stability 
First, one can be optimistic about continued regional security because of the 
nature of the arms dynamic and the causal relationship for arms procurements in 
Southeast Asia. Indeed, the foremost concern that Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore are 
engaged in “arms racing” has already been relegated for lack of supporting evidence. As 
such, while these neighboring states will continue to deal with the bilateral and 
multilateral challenges that occasionally hamper their relations, their track record has not 
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been to escalate tensions through arms procurements, which could fundamentally shift 
the arms dynamic beyond “maintenance” to a higher level of “arms competition.”  
In the end, these three countries in Southeast Asia clearly intend to continue 
building their nations on the basis of strong economic growth and stable regional 
relations. Their priorities are reflected in their budget allocations, their practice of 
maintaining economic ties with China whilst increasing military responses to address 
their SCS claims, as well as their abiding commitment to the ASEAN process. Resource 
availability and domestic politics will continue to dictate the arms procurement of their 
militaries, and the resultant arms dynamic of “maintenance of the status quo” will be a 
reflection of their desire for stability. 
2. Concern over Excursions toward Arms Competition 
Still, there is cause for concern over the phenomenon of occasional excursions 
towards “arms competition” that occur due to the desire for regional prestige. If the desire 
for prestige has caused occasional excursions, what other conditions could increase the 
frequency of such excursions? As this thesis has underscored the centrality of domestic 
drivers for arms acquisitions in Southeast Asia, there should be focus on situations where 
changes in the availability of resources or the domestic political backdrop could drive 
excursions to “arms competition” dynamics.  
In terms of resource availability, the evidence has been clear that procurements 
generally correlated with increased economic strength. In that light, a survey of the 
current economic trends would show that the global economic slow-down and depressed 
oil prices have taken their toll on the region, which had actually recovered strongly from 
the end of the EAFC till 2011. Indonesia suffered the most significant slow-down, with 
its GDP registering a relatively sharp 2.1 percent decline in 2014.325 As much as 
President Jokowi has struggled to implement “massive deregulation” of the economy to 
attract foreign investment, Indonesia economic growth was “at [it’s] slowest since 2009” 
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and the rupiah had fallen 8 percent against the U.S. dollar in 2015.326 Meanwhile, 
Malaysia and Singapore’s economies have also slowed down relative to the years before 
2011, as indicated in the GDP data of Figures 3 and 9. Therefore, with such an economic 
backdrop, the availability of resources for arms acquisitions would likely be reduced. 
This reduces the possibility of increased excursions to more competitive arms dynamics. 
In terms of domestic politics, it is argued that the concern is less about 
contestation of budget allocation, corruption, or the desire for regional prestige. Instead, 
the issue relates to the strength of the governments in power. Domestic politics have 
become more adversarial in all the three Southeast Asian nations, with the current leaders 
less influential than their “larger-than-life” predecessors like Suharto, Mahathir, or Lee 
Kuan Yew. Malaysia, in particular, has exhibited an accentuated display of ethnic politics 
with greater turmoil.327 Meanwhile, President Jokowi in Indonesia has also suffered a 
“rocky” start to his Presidency, hampered by his weakness relative to established 
domestic political elites.328 In Singapore, despite the strong swing of votes back to the 
ruling People’s Action Party in its recent election, it is clear that a new norm of political 
contestation has been developed and “pendulum [could] indeed swing back.”329 In such 
conditions, the concern is that leaders that are under pressure could resort to nationalistic 
cards to stir up support, presenting opportunities for regional conflicts to escalate more 
than they have been allowed to thus far. Hence, between the availability of resources and 
domestic politics, it is submitted that current trends in domestic politics demand more 
scrutiny as there exists possible scenarios where nationalistic appeals by different states 
can create more excursions to the realm of “arms competition.”   
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In all, the current arms dynamic amongst Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore 
provides a stable foundation upon which trade and regional cooperation through ASEAN 
has been sustained. Still, the future evolution of the arms dynamic is uncertain, in light of 
the optimism related to the current state of stability and the possible trajectories arising 
from the increasingly adversarial domestic political situations. On the one hand, it is clear 
that stability is better maintained if the countries set aside their differences and historical 
grievances to focus on forward-looking development and cooperation. On the other hand, 
the need to shore up domestic political support may drive leaders to exploit these very 
differences and historical grievances. Indeed, the stability founded upon “arms 
maintenance” should not be taken for granted, so as to prevent the occasional excursions 
to the “arms competition” from becoming more frequent. This is a caution that leaders of 
Southeast Asia should pay attention to prevent more frequent excursions of the arms 
dynamic that would essentially spell a permanent shift towards “arms competitions.”  
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